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CONTENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Claus Offe is a professor of political sociology at the Hertie School of Governance. **Hans-Ulrich Klose** was a member of the German Bundestag from 1983 to 2013, where he served as chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. **Ulrich K. Preuss** is a professor emeritus at the Freie Universität Berlin and at the Hertie School of Governance, where he taught public law and political sociology until 2010. **John C. Kornblum** was United States ambassador to Germany from 1997 to 2001. He is currently a senior counselor at Noerr LLP and a co-secretary of the American Academy's board of trustees. **Michael Ignatieff** is Professor of Practice at Harvard Kennedy School. He was a Richard C. Holbrooke Distinguished Visitor in spring 2013. **James M. Brophy** is the Francis H. Squire Professor of History at the University of Delaware. He was a Nina Maria Gorrissen Fellow in fall 2013. **Kiran Desai** was a Mary Ellen von der Heyden Fellow in Fiction in fall 2013. Her novel *The Inheritance of Loss* won the 2006 Man Booker Prize and the National Book Critics Circle Fiction Award. **LaToya Ruby Frazier**, a visual and media artist, is the Guna S. Mundheim Fellow in the Visual Arts in spring 2014. **Brian McAllister Linn**, a Bosch Public Policy Fellow in spring 2014, is the Ralph R. Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts and a professor of history at Texas A&M University. **Susan Stewart**, a John P. Birkelund Fellow in spring 2014, is Avalon Foundation University Professor in the Humanities and the director of the Society of Fellows in the Liberal Arts at Princeton University. **Andrei P. Tsygankov** is a professor of international relations and political science at San Francisco State University. **Jules Feiffer**, a Richard C. Holbrooke Distinguished Visitor in spring 2014, is a cartoonist, playwright, screenwriter, and children's book author and illustrator whose drawings have appeared in the *Village Voice* since the mid-1950s. His forthcoming book, a graphic novel, is entitled *Kill My Mother*.

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PUBLISHER Gary Smith
EDITOR R. Jay Magill Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR
Johana Gallup
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
John-Thomas Eltringham
ADVERTISING Berit Ebert, Anika Kettelhake
DESIGN Susanna Dulkinys & Edenspiekermann
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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Gary Smith
DEAN OF FELLOWS
Pamela Rosenberg
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER / CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
Christian U. Diehl

Am Sandwerder 17–19
14109 Berlin
Tel. (49 30) 80 48 3-0
Fax (49 30) 80 48 3-111
americanacademy.de

14 East 60th Street, Suite 604
New York, NY 10022
Tel. (1) 212 588-1755
Fax (1) 212 588-1758

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DIRECTOR'S NOTE

The Responsibility Project

"POLITICS WILL, TO THE END OF HISTORY, BE AN AREA WHERE CONSCIENCE AND POWER MEET, WHERE THE ETHICAL AND COERCIVE FACTORS OF HUMAN LIFE WILL INTERPENETRATE AND WORK OUT THEIR TENTATIVE AND UNEASY COMPROMISES."

— REINHOLD NIEBUHR,
MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932)

RICHARD HOLBROOKE believed in deploying every kind of available knowledge in facing seemingly intractable problems. His dogged immersion in the historical, economic, religious, social, and psychological dimensions of a given crisis provided the armature of his unconventional, reframing approach. In this sense he was a student of Sir Isaiah Berlin, who asserted, in 1988, "If we are to hope to understand the often violent world in which we live...we cannot confine our attention the great impersonal forces, natural and manmade, which act upon us. The goals and motives that guide human action must be looked at in the light of every intellectual resource that we have."

Now, in a century already witnessing struggles over historical borders, proper governance, state sovereignty, and humanitarian intervention, Holbrooke's approach is sorely missed. For precisely this reason the American Academy launched a new initiative in December 2013: the Richard C. Holbrooke Forum for the Study of Diplomacy and Governance. The Forum will bring the expansive network of the American Academy to bear upon the kinds of problems that Holbrooke would have taken up with energetic resolve: the resilience of authoritarianism, the increasingly fraught realignment of the post-1989 global order, the integration of China into the world's normative architecture, the encouragement of China, India, Russia, and Brazil to contribute more to the global public goods from which they benefit, and the problem of differing national legal cultures in their confrontation with international law.

On the evening of December 3 more than two hundred guests gathered at the Metropolitan Museum of Art to inaugurate the Forum. We are grateful to the extraordinary generosity of the evening's benefactors, led by Vincent and Anne Mai, Peter G. Peterson and Joan Ganz Cooney, Stephen Rattner and Maureen White, and longtime supporter of our foreign-policy initiatives, David Rubenstein, whose interview of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was a highlight of the evening. The stage also welcomed Ambassador Holbrooke's widow, journalist and author Kati Marton, the Academy's vice-chair Gahl Hodges Burt, and Harvard Kennedy School's Michael Ignatieff, who will co-chair, with Yale Law School's Harold Hongju Koh, the Forum's maiden Berlin symposium, in June, on the subject of statecraft and responsibility.

The redesign of the *Berlin Journal* by our longstanding collaborators at Edenspiekermann signals a new conceptual emphasis: by devoting a section to a single theme we aim to mirror some of the intellectual debates taking place at our Wannsee villa. This issue's deliberations on responsibility reflect the concerns of the Holbrooke Forum: an essay by political sociologist Claus Offe, a recent talk by Michael Ignatieff, and an edifying exchange on the vicissitudes of responsibility in global statecraft. We also proudly continue to feature a diverse mix of scholarly articles, short stories, artwork, and essays by our resident fellows and distinguished visitors—in this issue represented by James Brophy, Kiran Desai, Jules Feiffer, LaToya Ruby Frazier, Brian McAllister Linn, and Susan Stewart.

Our Notebook continues to offer news of internal developments, short biographies of our fellows, and coverage of recent events, including the Met gala and an excerpt from the preceding afternoon's expert roundtable, chaired by Josef Joffe, entitled "Germany in Europe, the US in the World: Two Reluctant Hegemons Who Just Want To Be Left Alone." This section also now includes several lengthy book reviews by or of works by our fellows and visitors, an addition we believe is vital for an institution that has stood proudly behind so many book projects.

I would like to use this space to bid a fond farewell to Pamela Rosenberg, our outgoing Dean of Fellows, who over the past four years has provided an inspiring intellectual and collegial presence. She will be missed, and we wish her the very best in returning to her passion of early childhood music education, among her other endeavors.

Finally, as we approach the twentieth anniversary of our founding—September 9, 1994, the day after the fabled Berlin Brigade marched out of this city and ended almost five decades of US military presence—I am proud to report that the American Academy has matured into a robust and creative institution, possessed of talented management, an entrepreneurial staff, and a clear sense of mission. We have a formidable endowment in place, thanks to the generosity of individuals, foundations, and corporations on both sides of the Atlantic. We are especially indebted to Anna-Maria and Stephen Kellen, Nina von Maltzahn, and the other descendants of Hans and Ludmilla Arnhold, all of who took a chance on an untested idea two decades ago and who continue to support the institution in extraordinary ways.

Gary Smith


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

The Responsibility Project

Ai Weiwei, *Stools*, 2014. Photo © Jirka Jansch, 2014

SHARED SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

A concept in search of its political meaning and promise.

by Claus Offe

THERE CAN BE NO doubt that responsibility and responsible agents are good things to have. It is always good to know who is responsible, for what they are responsible, and to whom. We the citizens can then turn, individually or collectively, to the responsible agent and ask for the correction of things that went wrong, or demand action that brings things in line with our own notion of the common good and what is deemed valuable, desirable, and just. We can also turn to each other and to ourselves. For, ultimately, we are responsible for authorizing political authorities to act in our name. Being aware of the institutional location of responsibility allows citizens of liberal democracies to act rationally by correctly addressing their demands, complaints, and expressions of political support.

Yet citizens of European democracies are often at a loss regarding the location of responsibility. Arguably, there was a time when the question of institutional responsibility and accountability was comparatively easy to answer. The incumbent government, which actively sought to be entrusted by voters with governing responsibility and risks losing it on the next election day, was the locus of responsibility. Four developments explain why this is no longer the case.

First, incumbent political elites are not only the *objects* of popular scrutiny, held accountable for what they do and fail to do; they are also *strategic agents*, who spend time and resources on managing their constituency's perception of responsibility by avoiding blame, claiming credit, and taking popular positions. The ubiquitous use of these patterns of strategic communication by political elites does not make it easy for ordinary citizens to assess with any degree of certitude who is actually responsible for which outcomes.

Second, the opaqueness of the question of responsibility is related to changing institutional realities, to a shift from *government* to *governance*. While "government" describes the clearly demarcated and visible authority of particular governmental office-holders and parties in legislative chambers to make collectively binding decisions, "governance" describes a matrix of more or less fleeting, multi-actor alliances spanning the divides between public and private actors, state and civil society, or national and international actors. The more such alliances come to dominate public-policy areas such as health, education, transportation, housing, and even security, the more difficult it is to establish clear links between decisions, their authors, and their outcomes.

Third, due to the endemic and seemingly chronic fiscal crisis that has befallen virtually every state in Europe, the range of matters for which the state and political elites can credibly promise to take responsibility has been shrinking dramatically. As a consequence, the state can no longer be held responsible for the removal of garbage from the streets of Naples or snow from German highways, to say nothing of addressing issues like child poverty, the sustainability of financial markets, or the environment.

Fourth, fiscally starved governments have resorted to strategies of shedding and re-assigning responsibilities in the decades since the ascent of neoliberalism as a hegemonic belief system guiding public policy. Citizens themselves have been "responsibilized," and the government's only remaining role is to activate and incentivize citizens so that they live up to their individual responsibility rather than expecting government to take responsibility for them.

Such appeals to the corrective powers of civil society are often little more than an attempt by political elites to absolve themselves of responsibility for social problems by transferring them to private hands and pockets. As the state withdraws from funding services and entitlements, citizens are left with no choice but to *themselves* practice responsibility for their present and future selves.

The shrinking scope of that for which governments accept responsibility discourages major parts of the electorate from taking an active interest in political life and holding governments accountable. As a result, those in the bottom third of society in terms of income, education, and security have in many countries largely given up exercising their rights as citizens. They do not know much about politics, do not vote, do not join social or political associations, and do not donate to political causes. Our democratic institutions and the political economies in which they are embedded have failed to provide a vehicle for effectively sharing responsibilities through governmental action.

The key normative principle of liberalism is that individuals should enjoy the legally secured liberty to make choices in life. They are responsible for the consequences of these choices, and outside forces should not be allowed to interfere. However, the realization of this ideal of liberty is problematic in two respects. First, individuals' actions affect others as well. If these externalities are negative, adversely affecting the well-being of others, then one person's freedom of choice can be said to constrain the freedom of choice of others. Therefore, in order for liberalism's highest value of freedom to be universally enjoyed, it must be limited at the level of individuals through statutory regulation, criminal law, and other measures.

Second, the range of an individual's free choice is not just determined by the legal guarantees securing it but also by favorable or unfavorable conditions, which can dramatically expand or severely restrict the range of choices individuals have at their disposal. These conditions arise due to pure luck and cannot be attributed to any behavior for which the individual is causally responsible.

Liberal theorists take care of the first of these two complications by imposing negative duties upon the uses individuals can make of their freedom, prohibiting things like theft and the pollution of the environment. They attempt to deal with the second complication by also imposing *positive* obligations. These collective positive obligations can take the form of public measures designed to prevent, compensate for, alleviate, or overcome individual hindrances due to luck. The underlying intuition is that only after the *equality of opportunity* has been secured can individuals seriously be held responsible for the uses they make of their liberty.

The rigid dichotomies of luck vs. choice, circumstances vs. personal responsibility, and structure vs. agency are deeply ingrained in liberal political thought. However clear these distinctions, their applicability and usefulness is strictly and increasingly limited. The better-off tend to claim causal responsibility for their advantage, attributing it to their own effort and ambition, thereby legitimating it. The worse-off are inclined to attribute their condition to circumstances beyond their control, thereby minimizing their responsibility and justifying claims to compensation. Conversely, if the worse-off try to assess the situation of the better-off, they will probably tend to magnify the role of luck, while the wealthy looking at the poor will emphasize the role of choice, particularly as this allows them to fend off compensation claims coming from the poor. Individual observers tend to draw the dividing line between luck and choice at very different locations. And rightly so. The ability to act self-confidently on the assumption that one's fate is largely a product of one's own choice is nurtured and encouraged by specific socio-structural conditions.

Can a student's success at school be attributed to voluntary effort invested in schoolwork? Or should it be attributed to the fact his family highly values scholastic achievement and enforces this valuation very strictly? Perhaps both of the supposed alternatives apply. The student's effort may be present because of parental strictness, and the distinction made meaningless because causal responsibility is shared between the two sides. Whatever we do voluntarily is embedded in and shaped by patterns of what Michael Walzer has called "involuntary association," such as family, ethnicity, religion, class, or nationality.

Indeed, all of us share—in ways that are immensely complex and hence impossible to disentangle—in the *causal* responsibility for what happens to or is achieved by each of us. Shared causal responsibility, thus understood, is not a lofty ideal. It is simply an important fact of social life.

While it is often not difficult to convince people that causal responsibility is in fact largely collective (think of climate change and other cases of environmental disruption), we need a lot more persuasive power to convince the same people that remedial responsibility—responsibility to take action once things have gone wrong—must also be shared rather than remain individualized and addressed selectively to victims and those least able to cope.

Child obesity, drug addiction, violent crimes, and teenage pregnancy are clear examples of individual problems that have devastating effects upon the lives and well-being of individuals but for which causal responsibility does not rest with the individuals and their behaviors *alone*. Statistical and epidemiological analysis suggests that, in international comparison, the incidence of such social pathologies increases when the inequality of income and wealth increases in a society. Since we are all responsible for the prevailing profile of income distribution, as well as social and education policies, we are all co-responsible for the effects that those inequalities generate.

Any system of social security and services institutionalizes, under liberal premises, the demarcation between individual choice and collective provision. The classical case is the distinction drawn between the "undeserving" poor, who have supposedly made unwise choices, and the "deserving" poor, who are victims of circumstances beyond their control. This line divides categories of risks and contingencies

with which individuals can be expected to cope by their own means from categories of conditions that require collective arrangements.

Since about the mid-1970s, powerful economic, political, and philosophical forces—together often summarily referred to as hegemonic "neo-liberalism"—have drawn European societies ever more in the direction of reading good or bad *outcomes* as deriving from right or wrong *choices* made by individuals. Therefore, remedial responsibility must also rest with individuals. Having made choices, they *deserve* the associated outcomes, which are seen as unproblematic in normative terms, as they are the just manifestation of individuals' freedom to make choices. The implicit warning: to move the demarcation line too far in the "wrong" direction—to provide too much space for collective provisions—would be both fiscally inefficient and detrimental to the core value of the freedom of choice.

According to this doctrine, social and economic "progress" is measured as nothing but increments of the aggregate total of individual incomes. All that you need to control your fate can be *purchased*—from bonds that provide retirement income to health food and anti-aging-pills that postpone retirement for as long as possible. If you happen to dislike and feel threatened by the people in your neighborhood, you can move to a gated compound. If you want to get ahead in your career, you can enroll in commercial training courses. If you want to enhance your mobility, you can buy a faster car. If you are unhappy with the temperature, cleanliness, and humidity of the air, you can have a good air conditioning system installed. It is your individual choice—and your responsibility—to provide these things within the constraints of your means.

However, this fixation on individual choice as the prime remedy to problems of well-being leads to significant negative externalities. The plain absurdity of such individualist and "presentist" thinking is evident if we consider damages affecting future generations or our future selves. Climate change and other aspects of intergenerational justice are probably the most serious cases in point. The future victims of the consequences of our present action and inaction are not yet present and cannot possibly raise their voices, but the long-term effects of our present action and inaction will soon become impossible to reverse or neutralize.

The obsolescence of neo-liberal ideology applies both to the *problems* we suffer and the *solutions* we may find to them. If we succeed in finding and implementing solutions to problems for which we are collectively causally responsible, we will not do so only through coercive regulation or through (dis)incentives addressed at individual utility maximizers. We need to strengthen the awareness of ordinary people and their readiness to cooperate in the achievement of common goods, their willingness to "do their share" even where it is not demanded by legal rules or by a selfish calculus of individual gain under politically set incentives. Such awareness, most likely generated by associations and movements within civil society, relates to knowledge about the positive and negative externalities that we inescapably cause for others as well as for our future selves.

Yet we should pause to note that ideal practices of assuming remedial responsibility—precautionary awareness of sustainability issues, solidarity with one's future self, civility, attention, and "considerateness"—are themselves constrained by conditions, among them the prevailing conditions of income, wealth, and access to quality education. Those least endowed with these critical resources often find themselves in a state that makes their engagement in the practice of sharing responsibilities unaffordable or otherwise inaccessible. Their time horizon, as well the social horizon of those to whom they feel obligations, is much narrower than those of the educated middle classes.

Indeed, poverty can make people act irresponsibly. If you have to live on a tight budget and with precarious job security, you cannot *afford* health food for yourself and your children. You are forced to look for the cheapest food, textiles, and means of transportation you can find. Fighting poverty should not be a matter pursued for the sake of the poor but for all of our sakes, as poor people and countries need to be enabled to share long-term responsibilities that they otherwise would not have the means to share. The concept of social progress should be reformulated in ways that highlight the need to raise the material welfare and security of the least well-off first in order to facilitate their readiness and ability to share responsibilities.

Of course, one individual's contributions to both causing problems and sharing in the responsibility for implementing a solution are infinitesimally small. (Think again of climate change.) It is therefore necessary to *trust* in the willingness of fellow citizens to share responsibility in order to make one's own efforts meaningful and instrumentally rational. Given the opaqueness and anonymity of "everyone else," it is not easy for individuals to build, maintain, and restore such trust.

Some advocates of remedies to sustainability problems that are grounded in civil society argue that state power should merely "get out of the way." They argue that any state action is inherently corrupted by interests of gain and power, while spontaneous and voluntary communal action emerging from civil society provides a more promising alternative to political institutions. Upon closer inspection this argumentation is a mirror image of the neoliberal critique of the state. It does not celebrate the liberating potential of market forces but of *civil society* and the communal remedies it supposedly harbors. Despite our dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of public policy, we should not forget that the democratic state and its powers to tax, spend, and regulate remain the major instrument for sharing responsibility among members of society. This instrument must not be done away with in favor of either the market or civil society but rather strengthened and supplemented.

Similarly, we would be ill-advised to leave the sharing of responsibilities to *economic agents*, such as investors in the stock market and businesses and their practices of "corporate social responsibility." Socially conscious investors

discriminate for moral reasons against industries that produce liquor, tobacco, firearms, and similar products. They do not do business with oppressive regimes or companies that act contrary to environmental or labor protection standards. What they also do, if unknowingly and by implication, is *increase* the return on investment for investors who are *not* morally discriminating, since "immoral" companies must offer higher yields per share in order to attract needed capital.

All of this suggests that constituted and democratically accountable state power should not be written off as an important approach to solving the problem of sharing social and environmental responsibilities. The democratic state, in spite of its limitations, remains—or must be restored to its role as—a key strategic agent both in containing the negative externalities of individual choice and creating and implementing collectively binding solutions.

MANY OF THE MOST serious problems facing modern capitalist democracies are caused by a logic of *aggregate* external effects. All of us, through the unintended side effects of what we do or fail to do, cause physical and social consequences that are typically impossible to trace back to individual wrongdoing. While we are beginning to understand our collective *causal* responsibility, we are still far from having the ideas and institutions through which we might exercise our shared *remedial* responsibility. Problems such as environmental destruction, climate change, various kinds of health hazards, financial market crises, the dumping of financial and other burdens on future generations, growing inequality, declining social cohesion, and political exclusion are caused by the way in which all of us consume, eat, move, invest, relate to others, and make use of our political rights in the perfectly legal and even subjectively innocent conduct of life.

Moreover, we often mandate or allow the holders of governmental office and democratically constituted power to turn a blind eye to our co-produced problems and to follow the patterns of inaction, procrastination, and "democratic myopia." The greatest deficiency in the conduct of governments today is arguably not that they *fail* to do what voters want but that they opportunistically follow the given interests and preferences of voters *too closely*—that is, without any attempt to alert and enlighten their constituency as to the adequacy and appropriateness of those preferences in relation to collectively relevant conditions.

Needless to say, democratic governments are not—and should not be—endowed with the authority to determine what the "objective interest" of the political community should be. But they may assist constituencies in finding for themselves the answer to that question. They can create an institutional space for consultation, deliberation, and collective self-observation within civil society. □

NORMS AND STATECRAFT

How can we think about responsibility in a post-Western world—responsibility conceived as moral commitment to people in zones of danger, but also as a commitment to generate global public goods? How do we improve responsibility for the emerging set of critical issues—climate change, energy security, the peaceful management of space and cyberspace—that lie beyond the competence of states? How do states and peoples work out solutions in these domains when the instruments of responsibility we possess—states and intergovernmental organizations alike—are not always up to the job?

To address these and related questions, the Academy convened a working roundtable on May 17, 2013, which included sociologist Claus Offe; political scientist Ulrich K. Preuss; Michael Ignatieff, Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School; Hans-Ulrich Klose, then vice-chair of the Bundestag's Committee on Foreign Affairs, and John C. Kornblum, a former US ambassador to Germany.

The following is an excerpt from their discussion.

John Kornblum: If one reads foreign policy literature in America or here, one sees many articles with titles like "Nationalism in Latin America" or "What we are going to do about Iraq?" But there are few systemic, critical discussions about broader questions related to the application of our values. The issue that we would like to focus on today, responsibility, is a very important part of this. Should the West feel obliged to intervene in places like Syria? Can one speak of "Western values" and if so, how can they be applied in global affairs?

Hans-Ulrich Klose: These are interesting questions, especially if one tries to answer them from the point of view of the present situation in Europe. I personally believe that the euro crisis is over, but the European crisis is still very real. All the demons of history, the prejudices and *ressentiments*, are back on the table. The happiness of Germans and others with Europe is declining.

Look at the demography of the world. The Western countries make up about 12 or 13 percent of the world's population right now. At the end of the century that will be down to about 7 percent. Politically, I draw two conclusions from this: Western countries must stick together, and they must look for partners that might become part of Western society.

Behind this lies my conviction that even with all the mistakes we've made and with all the problems we have, I don't see much that is better than what the Western countries have so far achieved.

Kornblum: One of the victims of the euro crisis has been a sense of consensus. There is a feeling on the part of young people that their governments aren't very responsible.

Claus Offe: Responsibility is a key concept not only in political theory and philosophy, but also in sociology. Who is responsible? To whom are they responsible? For what are they responsible? Who defines relationships of responsibility? Who monitors whether an actor is living up to his responsibility? I have been part of a study group in the Council of Europe that was convened to develop a concept of shared social responsibility as the foundation of social order.

An important distinction has to be made between causal responsibility and remedial responsibility. In the case of the euro crisis, we can easily assign responsibility for such an ill-conceived currency zone as the Eurozone. But the question remains: who is actually able to do something about this, to assume the burden? In this case, the consensus converges upon Germany.

The range of responsibilities can be very narrow—everyone is responsible for him or herself—and it can be extended by making the concept of responsibility more demanding in the temporal dimension. That is the moral of La Fontaine's fable of the grasshopper and the ant: that you need to think about the upcoming winter, to think beyond tomorrow. And then another dimension for enlarging the concept and making it more demanding is the social dimension, not just for yourself but for your family or mankind or anything in between: your fellow human beings.

The third dimension in which you can make the concept of responsibility more demanding is the cognitive dimension—being attentive to things that are going on around you. Richard Posner has written an interesting book chronicling the financial crisis, which describes the cause of the crisis as an ongoing attention deficit, cognitive denial, a refusal to take notice of what is going on. So these are three dimensions—temporal, social, and cognitive—in which you can extend the concept of responsibility.

But what are trends in the real world? Much of the philosophical, sociological, and political science literature has observed the powerlessness of governing elites. There has therefore been a powerful trend since the 1980s to pass on responsibility to individuals, to "responsibilize" them. This delegation of responsibility takes various forms. Labor market legislation is a case in point. Or the reform of psychiatric care, making families and local institutions responsible for care. While this is problematic in many ways, it is true that governments and governance agents of all kinds are dependent upon the informed cooperation of target populations. The success of policies depends upon the attitudes and dispositions of citizens who are or are not willing to practice responsible lifestyles. But in order for people to practice responsibility and to serve as a substitute for insufficiently implemented government, you need a widespread sense of trust or a sense of contingent obligation. I do my part only if I can trust in your readiness to do your part.

Here we have the problem that my fellow citizens, with whom I am supposedly sharing responsibilities, are opaque, are invisible. We do not know what their dispositions are, and there are no easy means to find out about this. There is a shortage of enlightened and informed cooperation within a long-term and attentive, solidary relationship. This has partly to do with the cognitive inaccessibility of my fellow citizens and the absence of trust relations with them.

Ulrich Preuß: I would like to raise two questions. Firstly, can we suppose, in a globalized world, with such a diversity of moral systems, historical experiences, economic constellations, and so forth, that there is one universal idea of trust? Trust has to do with closeness, with familiarity, and that is exactly what is missing in our present constellation. The problem is that even between Europe and the United States, there is some degree of alienation due to different cultural traditions—although, of course, the American tradition originates in Europe. But even between these two close continents, trust has become quite rare. Secondly, is our morality really

universal? It is not by accident that you mention the European Council as the source of your very interesting and inspiring insights about responsibility. The European concept of responsibility includes the responsibility to humankind. The whole issue of the "responsibility to protect" is rooted in the idea that we cannot stay inside when something like genocide happens in Rwanda or other parts of the world, because humankind is one moral community. Responsibility means we have to act on behalf of those who suffer. But is this idea of responsibility shared in other parts of the world? The idea that humanity is tantamount to a moral community is a European concept, but the world has changed and this Euro-Atlantic world is no longer the role model for civilization. If this is no longer undisputed, then of course the basic keystone of the "responsibility to protect" may erode. We live in a world in which we have to develop concepts that are universally valid.

Offe: The opposite of trust is the suspicion that others will engage in moral hazard. When I assume responsibility to serve a concept of the common good or shared moral values, I need to trust others that will reciprocate, that I will not be alone, and the beneficiaries of my responsibility will not engage in selfish little games. This is the backdrop of the current euro debate. How can we make sure that others will do their share if we engage in some measure of debt mutualization? We cannot trust that everyone else, even in Europe, to say nothing of Africa, will conform to the same standards. Therefore we have no reason to accept a moral obligation to serve universalist principles.

Michael Ignatieff: I approach the issue of responsibility through the concepts of the "responsibility to protect" and sovereign responsibility, but Claus is reframing the individual dimensions of responsibility: Who owes what? Who has to step up for what? This has become a crucial question in the international order and it is an especially interesting question, because responsibility used to be defined by an alliance structure: a NATO alliance structure, a European alliance structure, a European Union structure that defined the responsibilities of the West in a fairly clear manner. But beyond the West, the definition of responsibility was extremely diffuse. This is why we speak of China being a free rider, why we speak of so many big powers being free riders. They are riding for free on global public-policy goods created by a Western order.

I suppose our question is how we think about responsibility in a post-Western world, not merely moral responsibly for people in danger in other places, but responsibility to generate global public goods for a whole set of issues that extend beyond the sovereign state. From the oceans, to the biosphere, cyberspace, and the internet, there are a whole set of non-sovereign areas whose management will be crucial to our survival in the twenty-first century. We could define a whole range of areas that are escaping the sovereign state order, transnational problems that are escaping the responsibility networks that were created after 1945.

Kornblum: We are responsible because we feel responsible. Western societies are complex and they are often horrible, but when things go wrong in the world, there seems always to be a discussion as to what to do about it. Of course, we have very good strategic reasons for feeling responsible; we have very good economic reasons for feeling responsible. But I don't think most people talking about it even understand what those interests are. It's that people are being killed and we should do something about it. If that's the case, then to become responsible leaders you have to be able to build this sense of responsibility for one's fellow human being into a political structure, and that is very hard.

Ignatieff: What I find exciting is that the locus of responsibility is shifting as we speak. Ten years ago you wouldn't have Brazil in the room, and now you've got to have Brazil. And ten years ago you wouldn't have South Korea there. The locus of responsibility has been shifted by the transformation of global politics. And that then helps to define the problem. If you are not unipolar, if you are not bipolar, if you are polycentric in some way, how do we correlate responsibility? You have to consider sovereignty, because whatever else sovereignty is, whether it's democratic or not, sovereignty is a very clear institutional attribution of responsibility. Particular pieces of real estate get defined as the responsibility of someone—an authoritarian ruler, democratic system, whatever—and I think we are looking at a world in which that system of attributing responsibility is not adequate to so many of the issues that we are facing.

Kornblum: For all its morality, its strength, its power, the Federal Republic of Germany simply refuses to be responsible on a number of issues. It simply says no. Syria is one, Libya is another, Mali is another,

"CAN WE EXTEND THIS RIGHTS-AND-RESPONSIBILITY STORY BEYOND MASSACRE, ETHNIC CLEANSING, AND SLAVE LABOR? I WANT TO SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD DO THAT AND THAT THERE ARE, PERHAPS, FAINT SIGNS THAT WE ARE… BEGINNING TO MOVE FROM THOSE THREE TO FAMINE AND MALNUTRITION, WHICH CAUSE EVEN GREATER NUMBERS OF DEATHS EACH YEAR, AND ALSO TO PANDEMIC DISEASE. THIS WOULD COMMONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A MOVE FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE RIGHTS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THAT'S WRONG. ALL RIGHTS ARE OR MUST BECOME POSITIVE IF THEY ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE WORLD."

— MICHAEL WALZER, "HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL SOCIETY" (2005)

but there are also many more. The foreign minister, a good friend of ours, says Germany feels it has other ways of dealing with these things. I want to raise this because Germany is a very good case of one of the most responsible countries on earth, without a doubt, pulling back in one major part of responsibility. Is that fair?

Klose: To some extent, but not entirely. Germany hesitates to take military responsibility for historical reasons. But it is also fair to say that we are trying, step by step, to take more responsibility. When you think about what has happened since 1990, there have been steps in that direction. I would be frightened if Germany all of a sudden became a strong military power again.

Kornblum: But Germany is an interesting case because it shows how responsibility is a polycentric phenomenon. No country today is more responsible than Germany, but they have one major gap in their role. Other countries have other gaps.

Klose: We are actually afraid of taking the lead. The moment we take the lead others will immediately come and say, "You want to dominate."

Ignatieff: The Syrian crisis brings the German situation into focus. Nobody thinks Germany, or anyone, is going to send a brigade. But if you look at that arc from Morocco in the North Atlantic right through to Pakistan, and if you look at Germany's southern Mediterranean frontiers, it's a whole world out there where the issue of responsibility to the evolution of political order is very unclear. Part of the difficulty here is to think strategically without thinking imperially, to shift from imperial notions of responsibility, which are territorial control or manipulation or indirect empire, to some other sense of responsibility. And there is a sense that Germans think they have enough problems close to home, enough domestic responsibilities, enough European responsibilities. In the immediate German neighborhood, the dilemma is that there's no model of imperial or power-led responsibility in relation to Eastern Europe, to Ukraine, to all these places.

Offe: There are two obvious obstacles to taking responsibility. One is that, for historical and other reasons, the Germans believe that they will not be given credit for taking responsibility, that there will be suspicions that the hegemonic role they assume is less than benign. There are good reasons for that. The other is that political parties are unable to convince the domestic constituency, particularly ahead of elections, that it is a good idea to assume responsibility and the costs it involves.

Ignatieff: The issue of responsibility is so fascinating in Europe because, again, of the moral hazard issues. The resistance to debt mutualization is founded upon assumptions not just of responsibility and solidarity based on sovereignty. Whose interests are my interests? Whose fate is my fate? This is partly an issue of fellow feeling, partly an issue of common language and common culture. But we are also realizing that the Greek economy is our responsibility in a literal sense, that this tail can wag the dog in ways that people have not understood before. Germany is discovering its vulnerability with respect to these southern economies.

The European project is designed to allow the emergence of a hegemonic Germany with a European cover. This seems like a good thing to me, I don't have a problem with that. But that's what is making the discussion of responsibility so extremely difficult in Europe. No one in Europe knows who is responsible for what. Is it Brussels? Is it the national government? Is it subregional governments? Is it municipal governments? The question as to the opacity of responsibility once you've mutualized debt, fiscal policy, and monetary policies, the question as to who is responsible and whose interests become your interests, is very confusing to voters. It is transforming what a German voter thinks his or her responsibilities actually are.

The correlation between sovereignty and responsibility is such a difficult one to get beyond. It's not simply that Berlusconi is a bad leader, or that Papandreau was a bad leader. Everybody played the system. Nobody declared their swimming pools; the unions took more out of the pot than they put in. You didn't have political discipline, and suddenly the German voter wakes up and thinks: Is this my responsibility? Since when? You discover that it's not merely a transfer of moral responsibility; it's a transfer of active risk. When it looked as if the Greek exit would threaten the euro, the Germans thought: What are my alternatives? My alternative is the deutschmark, where every single car I'm trying to sell to China would become uncompetitive overnight.

Preuss: But Greece was pushed into the Eurozone because it was thought to be in the interest of Germany as well: the bigger the Eurozone, the better for the German economy. That means that Europe as a whole and Germany as a leading power in Europe should assume responsibility for the outcome.

Kornblum: The point here is that it is not, in the end, anybody's fault, because what we're talking about is Europe evolving past the Cold War. They thought that the best thing to do was to make the European Union stronger. The problem is that the European Union ran into globalization. And globalization is the thing which is ripping it apart in the end. The Greek economy could hide as long as it could devalue every five years, and now that it can't devalue, since Singapore and New York are trading its bonds all day, there's simply no place to hide. In the end, Mr. Klose has said the right thing:

the euro crisis has been more or less taken care of, but the European crisis is just starting. And the question of responsibility is going to be the major issue in the years to come. Who's going to be responsible for keeping this important organization running?

Gary Smith: This is the real reason that it is important to have this discussion about responsibility in its deployment. In the debate about Greece, recognizing the distinction between causal and remedial responsibility would change the discussion in a very helpful way.

Ignatieff: It seems to me that what is happening is that the anti-imperialist left has joined hands with a lot of the conservative right to say, "*Cité-jardin*, stay home." There is also a demonstrable futility with certain forms of taking responsibility for development, which confiscates responsibility from the agents who ought to hold it. But the idea of responsibility does not commit you to a constant defense of liberal interventionism. I actually think that it doesn't commit you to any line.

Preuss: I want to emphasize one point I think may be a little under-discussed here. I think that the main problem is not a lack of moral resources, so to speak, or the unwillingness of individuals and politicians to assume responsibility. I think the problem is rather the institutional locations of responsibility. So I agree with what Michael Ignatieff said a few minutes ago: that sovereignty is, so to speak, the basic traditional kind of attribution of responsibility in the political sphere. The problem is that this way of attributing responsibility doesn't work any longer. First of all, there are many, many states among the 190 states in the world that are simply not sovereign in the sense that they can assume responsibility for their territory, for their population, including fulfilling the responsibilities they have vis-à-vis other parts of the world, or the international community. And second, even if they are like the states of the Western world, they see exactly those problems that you mention, that sovereignty is no longer feasible, that it doesn't work. There is one prominent example for the dilemma of sovereignty being collectivized as it is in the European Union. This is the Security Council of the United Nations. And we see it doesn't work either.

That's the reason there is a tendency toward pulling back. Giving up sovereignty in an effort to create a new structure of responsibility has resulted more or less in a system of collective irresponsibility, at least in the European context. So I think this is the dilemma: sovereignty doesn't work any longer, but collectivizing sovereignty doesn't work either. There are many parts of the world that watch the European experiment with great interest, but they are reluctant. In other words, we must look for different institutional concepts for transcending sovereignty as the key issue, the key institutional cornerstone of responsibility toward some kind of collectivity which fits the kind of problems you mentioned.

Offe: The European Union used to be an idea like this, but it is now losing its foundation and its popular support rapidly. So, again, what is needed is vanishing in a way. Some *finalité* needs to be defined. Although the European Union, as Dieter Grimm has pointed out recently, has relied upon vagueness, there is now a need for *finalité*.

Ignatieff: I think one of the issues that has recast our understanding of responsibility going back a very long way in classical liberal theory, and that is relevant to this discussion, is the Invisible Hand. The Invisible Hand is a vision of collective outcomes that are not intended by any single agent and are not produced by any single agent and for which no single agent, i.e. a sovereign or government, takes responsibility. I think the reason why the issue of responsibility has returned is that the Invisible Hand looks terrific when you're experiencing 3 percent growth. Then you wake up one morning and discover that your pension is worth 25 percent less because the entire global market system has been deregulated in order to accelerate the spread of capital and accelerate the provision of credit.

There are lots of ways in which we are ideologically legitimizing not taking responsibility. Nobody wants a world where from one morning to the next their pension values are dropping by 25 percent. They go in good faith to good German universities, good Greek universities, good French universities, or good Bolivian universities, and are suddenly told that, because of actions and trends half a world away, their lives or the premise on which they built their lives is now over. I'm getting to the thing that Claus talks about, fatalism, where you just think, "I can't. I give up. I'm dropping out." And if you ask me where does fascism return, where does authoritarian populism return, it returns when political systems say, "We have no control over your life, smile, be happy, there is absolutely nothing we can do," and when the bad stuff happens to you, and you have to take a wheelbarrow full of money to buy some bread. We've been there.

This is where I think the responsibility issue becomes politically so urgent, and I guess I'm saying in some way I'm quite optimistic. I'm optimistic because we have no choice about this. We have to have political systems that take responsibility. We have to have political systems that deliver results. If we don't, bad things happen, which we've been through. So we don't need to run experiments. We don't have to get clever about what might happen. We know what will happen, and we cannot allow it to happen again. □

THE END OF INTERVENTION?

The following essay by Michael Ignatieff is derived from a talk he delivered on March 19, 2014, at London's Chatham House, home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The subsequent Q&A session was moderated by Lindsey Hilsum, International Editor of Britain's Channel 4 News.

From June 5 to 8, Michael Ignatieff and Harold Hongju Koh will co-chair the first Richard C. Holbrooke Forum working group, Statecraft and Responsibility, at the American Academy in Berlin.

When I planned this talk, in early March, I had entitled it "Is the Age of Intervention Over?" and was going speak about the West's failure to take decisive action in Syria. Since then, we've had an intervention no one expected.

Russia's intervention in Ukraine is obviously a hinge moment in the twenty-first century. Anyone who knows Ukraine must have a sense of foreboding about where Russian actions are headed. We in the West have sought to comfort ourselves with the thought that Vladimir Putin is a rational actor, moving his pieces about the geostrategic chessboard. We deeply want to believe that he knows what he is doing. At one level his strategic intentions seem clear enough: to secure the Crimean naval base in perpetuity and Russian access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Beyond that, his purpose is to prevent Ukraine moving into the NATO orbit and to insert a sliver under the finger of Ukrainian political culture so as to ensure that all political actors there remain constantly aware of the limits on Ukrainian sovereignty. His purpose, in short, is to constrain in perpetuity the self-determination of the Ukrainian people. He doesn't need to annex eastern Ukraine or invade the whole of the territory to render Ukraine subservient to his sphere of influence.

So far, so rational. But why should we suppose that Putin will continue to behave rationally? He has said his aims are confined to Crimea. Who knows whether that is true, or whether success will turn his head and lead him to overreach, since he had also said he wasn't going into Crimea. We simply don't know where we are, and we have no reason to trust what he says.

There is also the question of whether Putin can control the forces he has unleashed. As someone whose Russian ancestors are buried in Ukraine, I would emphasize a point made by Timothy Snyder of Yale. Ukraine forms part of what he calls the "Bloodlands," the blood-soaked ground of Eastern Europe cursed by a terrible history. What fills any observer with foreboding is the emerging confrontation between Ukrainian nationalists and Russians, both engaged in total denial of each other's history.

When Putin calls all Ukrainian nationalists "fascists," he is, of course, evoking 1941 and the collaboration of a tiny portion of the Ukrainian population in the German murder of the Jews in Ukraine. A relatively small number of Ukrainians did collaborate in that horrible crime, but to use the word "fascist" for all expression of Ukrainian nationalism is to demonize their politics. The Russian misuse of the word "fascist" evokes the ways in which Serbs called all Croatians fascist in 1991. When political language is used to demonize people and diabolize a cause, violence cannot be far off.

The language of fascism also works to conceal a Soviet genocide. Russians and those nostalgic for the Soviet Union use the language of fascism to hide, from themselves and then from others, one of the Soviet regime's most terrible crimes—the Holodomor—the forced starvation of seven million Ukrainian kulaks and peasants during Stalin's collectivization between 1931 and 1938.

So we have in Ukraine an accursed encounter between two languages of genocide that cannot speak truth to each other. This is the single most dangerous thing about the current situation—and why it's not over. There is simply no way for either side to share truth about the historical realities that are driving the passions, frenzies, and murderous desire for vengeance.

In other societies—Germany, South Africa, Argentina, Chile—shared truth has turned enemies into adversaries. Not in Ukraine. Not in Russia. A blood-soaked past remains unacknowledged and unshared. Such pasts are already inflaming and envenoming the present.

Ukraine also casts light on the new shape of the post-Cold War order. With Russia's unilateral seizure of Crimea, the stability of the borders of all post-Soviet states is put in question. No country that borders Russia is not concerned about its territorial integrity and the future of its sovereignty. A tremor of fear is running down a wide arc of peoples from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The denuclearization of Ukraine so happily agreed to in 1994 now seems a bitter irony to Ukrainians. They traded their nuclear weapons for assurances about their territorial integrity from Britain, the United States, and Russia. There will be some Ukrainian nationalists who now wish they had never given up their nuclear weapons. They would have given them a guarantee of sovereignty worth considerably more than Western assurances. Other vulnerable states—Iran perhaps, North Korea certainly—will conclude from the Crimean story that they should accelerate their already advanced nuclear programs.

Putin's normative justification for the seizure of Crimea was "to protect" ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers from imminent danger. The protection language is a language with which I have a certain association, since I was a member of the International Commission on Sovereignty and Intervention that devised the notion of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P). The language of responsibility to protect has now been served back to us in the form of mocking parody.

Those of us who have defended the language of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians need to purify it of the grotesque caricature of its principles.

Three clarifications seem in order. First, if you're going to advance the normative justification of protection when you use military force, then a normative criterion you must meet is that you must protect everybody. What is parodic about Putin's language is that he is using force to protect just one group of human beings. Secondly, protection has normative validity only when those protected are threatened with ethnic massacre or genocide. That was what the R2P criteria were, and they're worth restating, since a lot of people think if you say, "We must use force to protect civilians," that you can use that language when their democracies are overthrown, when they've got bad governments. Not so. The triggering conditions for justified protection were that civilians must be in mortal threat of their very lives. In the case of the ethnic Russians, there was no such threat.

Protection was in the UN Security Council mandate to authorize the intervention in Libya. There, protection of civilians morphed very quickly into regime change. In Crimea, what has bounced back to us has been Russian fury, some of it justified, at the ways in which "protection" in Libya was used to justify regime change. So, moving forward into the future, if we're going to protect civilians, let's protect civilians; let's not make it a cover for regime change.

The use of protection language in Libya created a precedent Putin was happy to exploit. The question we need to ask now is whether protection of civilians in Crimea is going to become the justification for Russian regime change in Ukraine. If "protection" of Russian civilians in Ukraine were to be turned into a justification for regime change in either eastern Ukraine or in the country as a whole, that would be a recipe for civil war. For Ukraine will have no choice but to fight.

Events in Ukraine also force us to be clear about the international law of secession. Putin is saying unilateral secession of Crimea is mandated by the popular consent shown in the referendum. With Spetsnaz [Russian Special Forces] watching over the voters going to the polls, this was constrained consent at the very best. But even if it was genuine consent, the fact that it was unilateral, without the consent of all of the Ukrainian people, is bound to store up trouble for the future. The normative principle we need to reaffirm in international affairs is that you can't compel a people to remain inside another country if they withdraw their consent, but if they leave they retain obligations to the normative and constitutional order they wish to leave: the constitutional order of Ukraine, but also of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain. This is a counterintuitive thought but a deeply important one. Why are seceding groups bound to respect the constitutional order of a state they wish to leave? To avoid civil war. There are twenty other reasons I could offer, but that's the one that matters.

The unilateral secession of Crimea is unacceptable to the majority of the Ukrainian people. It's force majeure, and the long-term consequences of this are explosive, not just for Ukraine, but for other small nations in Europe that may want to leave their constitutional homes. Look no further than the United Kingdom. A Scottish referendum is legitimate: both sides agreed to its terms and will abide by its result. Were the Scots to decide to secede in September—and don't exclude that as a possibility—what then must follow is a protracted negotiation about borders, defense installations, national debt, and currency. It would be painful work, but it would be negotiated by both parties, and thus, if successful, would avoid civil war. Unilateral secession of Crimea, followed by unilateral secession of eastern Ukraine, would plunge the country into civil war.

Let me come to Syria since Syria and Ukraine are linked. It was always going to be difficult to get any common action by Russia and the US to stop the killing there, but now it seems to me to be absolutely impossible. I understand that the Americans and the British are deeply reluctant to intervene. The democratic constituency for humanitarian intervention has evaporated—and for good reason: because of well-founded disillusion about Iraq, Afghanistan, and the costs of both.

So obvious are these costs that the public has turned against intervention altogether. I wish to remind you, though, that no one is dying today in Kosovo or in Bosnia. Sometimes interventions do work. Nevertheless, the democratic legitimacy for the use of force has collapsed in Western states.

As the bodies pile higher in Syria, however, sooner or later Western governments will be faced, once again, with the question of what to do to stop the carnage. The age of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians is not over, because civilians keep dying. Massive civilian death is more than a matter of shame. When it occurs in a geostrategically important region of the world, it imposes geostrategic costs on everybody, even the Russians. Sooner or later, Syria will demand action once again.

If you ask me what to do about Syria: I would engage in air interdiction to stop Assad from using air power—barrel bombs, helicopters—to torment and kill civilians. The only defensible purpose for the use of force in Syria would be to stop the massacre of civilians and to force Assad to deliver a ceasefire. We would use force to say to Assad, "You can't win. You can hold onto what you've got, but you can't win, so come to Geneva and negotiate a ceasefire." A government ceasefire would give the rebels an incentive to impose one of their own, and once the killing stopped and civilians

could be relieved of their torment, talk at Geneva might consolidate the ceasefire, leaving everyone in possession of what they hold, into something more permanent. That, and not regime change, is the best we can hope for.

In 2014, we're in a new world, split in two between authoritarian regimes and democratic ones, a world so split over the use of force to protect civilians that both sides serve each other parodic versions of the other's argument. It's a new world but also a return to a very old one indeed, the one described in the Melian dialogue in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, where "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." From the Baltics to the Black Sea coast in southern Europe, all the countries that face Putin will now want security guarantees from us. Those in NATO will get them. Those without will not. The weak will suffer what they must.

It's a good thing that, thus far, the strong have not pushed their argument to the edge of war. It is a good thing that mutual economic dependence—on finance and energy—restrains hotter heads, but let us not be so naïve as to believe either that economics will trump politics or that all the actors in this drama will remain rational chess players. The world is too dangerous for us to entertain such illusions.

Lindsey Hilsum: You said the Scottish referendum was legitimate because both sides agreed. The Serbs didn't agree on Kosovo's independence.

Michael Ignatieff: No. We are paying in Crimea for the consequences of unilateral military, or non-Security Council approved, action in Kosovo, and we're paying the price of the ICJ's [International Court of Justice] judgment in 2010 that unilateral declarations of independence by seceding states are not violations of international law. I felt as a Canadian that that was a catastrophic judgment. The Kosovo judgment served to rationalize Putin's case, and Putin is serving up a series of international law justifications that are parodic versions of some of the ones that he didn't like in the 1990s.

Hilsum: But you were a big supporter of the intervention in Kosovo, and surely the secession was the logical culmination of that intervention. I remember going and spending time in Kosovo, and people were saying, "Well, we're neither a state nor not a state. The banking system doesn't work and nothing works because we can't relate to the state of which we are part, which is Serbia, and yet we're not independent." So, you can argue that that was all our fault for the intervention.

Ignatieff: I don't think it was our fault. I think it was [Slobodan] Milošević's fault. The action we took, the reason why Kosovo had to secede is that the MUP (Ministry of Interior) and the Serbian military were killing Kosovars.

Hilsum: That was earlier, but when Kosovo actually seceded, Serbs were no longer killing Kosovars. At the time it seceded the war had stopped and it was effectively no longer connected to Serbia, apart from in Mitrovice.

Ignatieff: Well, the question is whether you could maintain a sub-state, Taiwan-like, non-fully sovereign Kosovo, and, on balance, the judgment was that you couldn't. I was in fact part of an international commission that recommended what we called "conditional independence" for Kosovo—that is, not fully sovereign independence, precisely for the reasons that you advise, and it seems to me in the future we may have to look at that kind of thing.

Hilsum: You certainly were somebody who believed—from a moral perspective and political perspective—in humanitarian intervention. Do you think that you were wrong? Do you no longer believe what you used to believe because of what's happened?

Ignatieff: I think I was certainly wrong—I've said lots of times I think I was wrong—about Iraq. There's no question about that.

Hilsum: You were in favor of the intervention in Iraq?

Ignatieff: Well, it's a long story but the short answer is yes, and the reason was I had been up to see what Saddam Hussein had done to the Kurds, and if you've seen a people who have been hit with poisoned gas, it sears you all the way down, and this is an object lesson in the effect of strong emotion on political judgment. I had such strong emotions about the Kurds that it led me to accord trust to agents, Rumsfeld and Bush, and so on, who deserved no trust at all. (The only thing I'd say is that the Kurds are living the best hours of their history as a consequence. That's not a justification for the mistakes or the cost. I still think it was a mistake.) So yes, of course, you learn. We should be extremely circumspect about the use of force. It should always be a last resort. It wasn't the last resort in this case, and the evidence was systematically falsified. One of the deepest reasons why people have backed off from intervention was that they feel their consent was manipulated. The wells of democratic trust were poisoned by Blair and Bush, and that means that in Syria—when people are being massacred and there's a genuine case to interpose and stop them dying—we won't be there because the wells were poisoned. My point is not that military intervention isn't dangerous. It certainly is. Not that it can't go wrong. It certainly can. I just don't want us to back ourselves into a position where we refuse an instrument when last resort really requires it.

Question One: Is the age of normative thinking over? What is normative analysis? Because we listened to Putin three or four weeks ago saying he wouldn't go into Crimea. He did. He says he doesn't want to divide Ukraine, and analysts including those in Ottawa and elsewhere have been working on certain assumptions about what logical normative analysis is; that's been overturned considerably.

Ignatieff: Normative thinking is in trouble in a world in which you have Spetsnaz airlifted into Simferopol and you have coercion of a free election and you have no guarantee that Putin doesn't go into Donetsk. But I still think it's extremely important for us to figure out what principles actually matter to us, what red lines we can't actually have crossed, and one of them is unilateral secession under force. We don't want that. We want, I think, to reflect seriously about other things. Don't make promises you can't keep. There's something normatively embarrassing to me that we signed the Budapest Declaration guaranteeing the territorial integrity of a state [Ukraine] and had absolutely no intention of doing so. That's the function of normative thinking here: to clarify what we should care about.

Question Two: It has been suggested that there was a lot of frustration in the corridors of the European Union because the technocrats in charge of negotiations with Ukraine forgot to check on Russia's likely reaction. But surely they have a responsibility to know the history and to make some effort in this regard, given the trouble we're now in.

Ignatieff: One of the problems that Europe had was not simply that they didn't get a credible offer to Ukraine in time. They didn't have an interlocutor whom any reasonable person could trust. Remember that they were negotiating with [Viktor] Yanukovych, who's a crook. That's the problem. You can criticize Catherine Ashton and the Europeans all you want, but you can't get a deal until you've got an interlocutor you can trust. You've now got that possibility—and I don't want to sweep by the difficulties about the current interim regime—but, by God, we ought to be stepping up now with some loan guarantees and some stabilization and also to acknowledge what is a fact: that Ukrainian membership in NATO is perceived by Russia to be a strategic threat. So we need to understand the complex reality we're dealing with here. We need to protect Ukrainian sovereignty from further incursion but not provoke the Russians by giving Ukraine NATO associate-status tomorrow.

Question Three: Michael, do you at this point think that the concept of responsibility to protect has actually taken us any further forward in the practical discussion of intervention? I was hopeful when the report appeared that it moved us beyond what had become a rather sterile debate about military humanitarian intervention. It now seems to me that that debate is in exactly the

same place as it was, and I don't find that in any other way the concept has helped me as a practitioner decide what in practice to do across the broad area of preventive diplomacy, peace-building, et cetera.

Ignatieff: I think the honest answer is that at the very least R2P is in very serious trouble. What I tried to do in this talk is rescue the concept of protection, and to attempt to define what the normative criteria are that you would have to apply if you're going to use the word "protection" in UN resolutions or in any operation to come. But I would freely concede that we don't know what the operational correlates of R2P are at all. In each different situation you can get some normative language (of the kind I'm trying to provide) about your objective being to protect civilians. How you actually do it on the ground varies in each case, depends on your capabilities. The only thing I've learned about this is that if you make protection of civilians the mandate, don't make promises you can't keep. That means you have to have the military capability to return fire. "Protection is a promise," and if you make a promise, it has to be correlated to capabilities that are actually robust. Getting those capabilities from states is extremely difficult. So to your question, "Has R2P taken us forward?" I would say: a millimeter and a half.

Hilsum: Is this an end to humanitarian intervention? Did we kill it? Did Putin kill it? Or is it just very sick at the moment, but with enough hope and enough nurturing and healing we can cure it?

Ignatieff: There is no doubt that Putin has poisoned the language and poisoned the wells. We on the Western side are also paying the consequence of Kosovo and other actions. I defend Kosovo, but you pay a price when you step outside international legality. I'm trying not to be an apologist for humanitarian intervention. I don't care about R2P. What I care about is UN missions that work, civilians that actually get protected. Thanks to our interventions there, nobody is dying in Kosovo or Bosnia. And they are dying in Syria. So all I care about is consequential international action that is clear about its moral purpose, limited in its expectations, adequately staffed with competent, capable, hardworking people who have the equipment to do the job—and the job is to protect human beings from horror. □

FEATURES



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PUSHING BACK

How some clever German publishers evaded the crackdown on their trade.

by James M. Brophy

FOLLOWING THE OFFICIAL ban on his popular but short-lived monthly *Die Lokomotive,* in 1844, the German writer Friedrich Wilhelm Held published a booklet entitled *Censuriana, oder Geheimnisse der Censur* (The Secrets of Censorship) to vent his rage against the German Confederation's machinery of repression. He noted that whereas authors used to disregard state edicts on the control of information, now an "army of censors" had honed its craft to "horrible perfection" so it could destroy thought at will. Censorship, he wrote, was the "arsenic of science"—a lettre de cachet issued by despotic rulers, a "literary Herod" who "eradicated all newborns" in order "to kill the newborn king of Intellect," and, not least, the "vulture of Prometheus," inflicting daily pain on the heroic author for delivering the flame of truth. Held likened Germany's intellectual state to a "misshapen cripple" who was nothing more than an "object of pity among its free neighbors."

Held's literary indignation resonated with a larger chorus of fellow authors, editors, and publishers in Central Europe, and for good reason: in reaction to the liberal impulses awakened in Germany's wars against Napoleon, in the years 1813–19, Austria and Prussia pressed the German Confederation to pass the Carlsbad Decrees, in 1819. These confederal laws rolled back rights of assembly, speech, and print as well as establishing a police apparatus to investigate subversive political activity.

Moreover, the resurgence of constitutional liberalism after the July Monarchy and the 1832 Hambach Festival—Germany's first political demonstration for constitutional rights—compelled Austria's foreign minister, Klemens von Metternich, to initiate tighter restrictions. The Confederation not only intervened to rescind the city of Baden's recently enacted law of freedom of the press, it also passed the "Six Articles" of June 1832, which further restricted parameters for citizenship. Add to these measures the secret resolutions of Vienna in 1834; the banning of the Young Germany group in December 1835; the flight of German authors into

exile; and the constant revisions of censorship laws throughout Germany in the 1840s, and a picture of a repressive cultural climate takes shape.

Indeed, the magnitude of state intervention in Germany's public sphere could be downright grim. Friedrich Ludwig Weidig, the democratic theologian and teacher who co-authored *Der Hessische Landbote* with Georg Büchner in 1834, was mentally and physically abused by Hessian officials: no heat, no light, no correspondence, no visitors. Weidig was found with a slashed jugular vein in February 1837, left to bleed to death. Contemporaries regarded his death as either suicide or murder.

GERMAN AUTHORS like Friedrich Wilhelm Held were wont to lavishly underscore their status as victims, but both they and their influential German publishers presided over the largest print market in Europe, wielding unquestionable communicative power. In fact, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the convergence of mechanized printing, rising literacy, and an irrepressible appetite for fiction and ephemera pushed the number of new titles by German publishers from 2,500 in 1817 to over 11,000 titles in 1846. They rolled out more new books in more formats for more audiences than any other European country. In meeting demands for knowledge and entertainment, the publishing industry confronted the glaring contradiction of post-Napoleonic Germany: the free movement of individuals and goods alongside the establishment of restrictive political regimes. It is within this world that a cadre of publishers transformed Germany's information order into a recognizably modern public sphere.

Publishers of this era were entrepreneurs who packaged print in innovative ways. They scouted talent, promoted trends in literature and journalism, speculated on translations, and linked German print circuits with those of Western Europe and North America. Above all, they were intellectual midwives who made the careers of freelance authors or journalists. The careers of Young Germany authors (Karl Gutzkow, Heinrich Laube, Theodor Mundt), of the Left Hegelian intellectuals (Arnold Ruge, Bruno Bauer, Moses Hess, Ludwig Feuerbach), and of exiled writers (Jakob Venedey, August Ludwig von Rochau, Ludwig Börne, Karl Heinzen, Heinrich Heine) rested on the moral and material support of a breed of publishers who combined commercial savoir faire with a high regard for a free press. These publishers were also the entrepreneurial minds who brought penny magazines and illustrated weeklies into German homes. They were the commercial geniuses who branded great writers as "classics" and introduced the era of "complete works." And they developed a circulatory system of newspapers, weeklies, monthlies, philosophical journals, brochures, lithographs, and caricatures that pumped the oxygen of political modernity directly into Central Europe.

There were many types of publishers—then, as now: ennobled elites, premodern bourgeois patricians, market-driven speculators, grub street hacks, incorrigible scoundrels, and many small-scale provincial printers. In early nineteenth-century Germany, this diversity was doubly rich; there were the well-known names like Johann Friedrich von Cotta, one of the leading publishers of Weimar Classicism and the founder of Germany's most influential nineteenth-century newspaper, *Augsburg's Allgemeine Zeitung.* He and Carl Bertuch, the esteemed Weimar publisher, attended the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, dined with Europe's leading statesmen, and parlayed for freedom of the press.

Less polished but equally influential was the publishing outsider Friedrich Arnhold Brockhaus, whose speculative energies were matched with a defiant spirit to sell books, whether governments liked it or not. Between 1818 and 1820, Brockhaus relied upon eight publishing houses and their forty presses to produce his ten-volume encyclopedia with a first run of 12,000 for a sensationally low price. The edition moved 150,000 copies, thus heralding mass-market print. The storied Hamburg publisher Julius Campe mastered the art of packaging oppositional literature: he offered 146 works from 36 banned authors, including 22 titles by Heinrich Heine in seventy editions. Or the remarkable Carl Joseph Myers, from the tiny state of Sachsen-Meiningen, who unleashed a new era of popular print in 1826: a "miniature library of German classics" that went for two groschen apiece and sold hundreds of thousands of copies through colportage.

One of the icons of the industry was Friedrich Perthes, the author of the canonical *Der deutsche Buchhandel als Bedingung einer deutschen Literatur* (German Book Trade as a Necessity for German Literature), whose gravitas was a driving force in organizing the central association of German book traders (Der Börsenverein für den deutschen Buchhandel) in 1825. A staunch monarchist in favor of censorship, Perthes lifted book dealing above the fray of mere commerce, portraying the trade as a noble vehicle of culture, civilization, and progress. Finally, there was Otto Wigand, the first-look editor of radical democracy, a bookmaker who cut his teeth in Pressburg and Budapest but settled in Leipzig as a wealthy publisher. He not only supported Feuerbach, Bauer, Ruge, and Engels but also published the first Hungarian encyclopedia and popularized the Enlightenment with countless translations from French and English.

These German print middlemen, and the many more of them who have been forgotten, internationalized their century of words. During the period 1770 to 1815, there were roughly 16,000 (15,936) translations from French into German: 6,600 monographs and 9,300 essays. (Many of these translations were English books, telling us how Anglophone ideas entered into Central Europe.) Some 261 book dealers in 91 German cities corresponded with Parisian publishing houses. The scale and scope of such transfers increased after 1815; the "translation factories" of the Franckh brothers in Stuttgart, J. P. Sauerländer in Frankfurt, and Bernhard Tauchnitz in Leipzig typified publishers who translated Victor Hugo, Eugène Sue, Honoré de Balzac, Georges Sand,

Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Gaskell—novels whose social criticism reframed the "horizon of expectations" of readers.

Between 1827 and 1829, the Franckh brothers sold over three million copies of Walter Scott and went on to translate dozens of other authors. Other publishers translated forbidden texts from France's revolutionary tradition: Jean-Paul Marat, François Noël Baboeuf, Louis Blanc, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Auguste Blanqui, Félicité Lamennais, Henri de Saint-Simon, and a raft of works by and about Napoleon. In the years between 1791 and 1848, there were at least 13 translated publications of Thomas Paine, which is perhaps why Paine earned a bit part in Georg Büchner's revolutionary drama, *Dantons Tod* (1834). Indeed, entangled discussions of the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Cadiz Constitution of Spain, and the Latin American Revolution coursed through Germany's various print markets. Even Alexis de Tocqueville made his way to Germany.

All of this publishing and translation activity raises some obvious questions: How much did censorship actually work? How decisive was censorship in shaping Germany's public sphere? Was it successful in insulating German readerships from oppositional and subversive political literature at home and abroad?

States of the Holy Roman Empire had long claimed regulatory rights of print. And generations of printers had handled censorship in due course and successfully vended forbidden books in semi-legal ways, in semi-public places, over very porous borders. German particularism fostered a formidable repertoire of tricks that enabled publishers and book dealers to distribute forbidden material: foreign imprints, commissioned printings, shrewd middlemen at book fairs, reliable smuggling routes, flat-out bribery.

Building upon generations of experience, German book dealers were masters of loopholes—so much so that we need to readjust our perception of censorship's effects. Many "banned" or censored authors were actually published and widely read. Between 1835 and 1842, for example, the Confederation placed a "total ban" on the five authors of the Young Germany group—Heine, Gutzkow, Laube, Mundt, and Ludolph Wienbarg—because of their irreverence for religion and morality. Book dealers and commissioners were also threatened with fines and prison sentences for handling their texts. Nevertheless, between 1836 and 1841, Gutzkow published at least a dozen books—a mélange of fiction, drama, reviews, biographies and essays. He also edited and wrote for three newspapers: two in Frankfurt and one in Hamburg, the *Telegraph für Deutschland.* Laube was no less active, publishing over a dozen titles in the same period, among them a four-volume history of literature, in addition to novels, travel literature, and social commentary. As for Heine, the most famous of the group, he regarded the ban as a "lot of noise and of little consequence." For an author who had long perfected an "aesthetic of censorship," Heine was only minimally affected by the ban.

What these sweeping prohibitions did accomplish, however, was not quite what they intended: the creation of a tense, complex cultural climate that generated an even more barbed style of satirical journalism, which, in turn, spawned a market for camouflaged political discussion. The sensation of "the ban" awakened a sustained appetite for satire, innuendo, allusion, equivocation, political verse, and philosophical journalism throughout the 1840s. Under censorship, readers came alive to critical nuance and irony's edge.

Moritz Saphir, Adolf Glassbrenner, and Albert Hopf represented a new generation of wits whose social sarcasm proved devilishly difficult to censor. How does one police an idiom whose meaning is opposite of what it states? Such innovations aren't marginalia but rather central points to understanding how political culture developed different registers to accommodate the expansion of reading publics. "The author is induced, provoked, even necessitated to write in a manner that is hidden and ambiguous, subversive and vicious," remarked a contemporary, "and the reader, accustomed to such malice and oppositional spirit, is encouraged to read between the lines and to extract more poison than was originally intended." In publishers' terms, this means that censorship enhanced attraction to—and the increased sale—of books. Campe, for example, ruminated on his own incongruous relationship to censorship.

It sounds frivolous and yet it is plausible: without the conditions of German censorship, without the sustained threat of bans, confiscations, and court verdicts, Julius Campe would have never attained the significance that the brand name Hoffmann & Campe possesses.

Alongside irony, censorship also encouraged innovative print formats with hybrid functions to market political ideas: almanacs, calendars, handbooks, yearbooks, lexica, and travel literature all became highly politicized genres. It is perhaps the calendar *Der Wanderer am Rhein* that most threatened the "information order." For it was here that farmers and laborers encountered democracy and socialism as reasonable alternatives. Through this format, the ordinary German joined the political nation.

ALL STATES IN THE German Confederation required prepublication censorship, but some states were more strenuous than others, enabling certain publishers to present works to milder censors in the cities of Bremen, Hamburg, Holstein's Altona, Saxony, Baden, Sachsen-Altenburg, Sachsen-Meiningen, Weimar, Brunswick, or Württemberg to receive the all-important imprimatur: the right to sell. But publishers also gamed the system to sell books without such permission. Many states required a censor's review of the final version of a text to guarantee that the necessary changes were made. But publishers in Saxon received transit permits immediately upon depositing their copy, which enabled them to ship books before the censor could review the text. The Prussian state stipulated a 24-hour review period before books were transported, but here, too, publishers deployed shenanigans—

submitting books late in the day, or having the carts loaded and ready to go aided in their distribution before the machinery of confiscation was set in motion. Once the books were bound and ready, they found their way into circulation, banned or not.

The process of evasion was not easy or simple, and to understand the success of circulation, one must acknowledge the hundreds of book dealers, printers, typesetters, binders, carters, porters, warehouse owners, and book-fair commissioners who participated in this time-honored conspiracy. As one of Metternich's agents complained in 1833:

> *Bookstores ... are connected together in a network bound by protection and trust. They constitute their own special form of state, through which they spread their commercial influence. They mutually support one another through every conceivable means at their disposal.... It is therefore all the more difficult to trace the secret deliveries of banned books, especially when thousands of complicit souls offer a helping hand to this form of smuggling.... In this way, book smuggling and its many preparatory phases are carried out with incomparable cleverness.*

BANNED BOOKS even underwent second printings. Börne's *Parisian Letters* was banned with great fanfare, but the first run of 2,000 sold out immediately, and so the printer Johann Friedrich Pierer, in Altenburg, printed 1,500 more for the Hamburg publisher Julius Campe. Hoffmann von Fallersleben's *Unpolitical Songs* was banned in most north German states, but the book sold more than 20,000 copies. The Prussian state was apoplectic about Johann Jacoby's subversive *Four Questions* of 1841, but Jacoby was fortunate to have a Leipzig publisher, Georg Wigand, who used the forged imprint of a Mannheim printer to facilitate transportation, circulation, and sale of the work.

How many books were banned? The variation of crackdown is wide. In Saxony, a mild censorship regime,

its collegia banned 53 books over the period 1833 to 1843—an average of five books a year, a low number that does not include bans at the confederal level. In Prussia, the numbers were tenfold, to the tune of fifty or so books a year; in 1845, Berlin's censorship court banned 53 books, and an 1846 document lists 46. In Austria, the numbers were much greater. Between 1750 and 1850, the Habsburg Empire banned over 50,000 books. In the years 1830 to 1848, banned books ranged from 900 to 1400 per annum.

It would seem that Austrian censorship was the most extreme, but this must be qualified by noting the numerous exemptions available to the Austrian middle classes to gain access to banned books. Thousands of texts doomed under *damnatur* still found government exemption. The next severe category, *ergat schedem*, yielded to a qualified and certified readership. The *transeat* allowed the sale but not the public notice of certain books, and the *permittitur* authorized reprints of foreign books—another way of smuggling ideas.

These figures portray three different scales of censorship. Saxony deliberately dragged its feet with any form of compliance, largely because the book industry was too important to its economy. For Prussia, historians typically invoke its ruthless bureaucratic practice, but as recently argued by Bärbel Holtz, a censorship expert at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, characterizing Prussian censorship as a well-oiled machine is inaccurate. Its censorship administration remained understaffed, underfinanced, and chronically unable to execute its duties. At the central level, the Ober-Censur-Collegium (1819–43) lacked executive authority, its own office, its own budget, and even a proper job description. Coordination between local, regional, and central ranks was poor and prone to enormous delay. The entire system's preference for individual judgment over normative guidelines was perhaps its fundamental flaw, resulting in widespread inconsistency among local censors, who could be incompetent, officious, or, by contrast, learnedly predisposed toward authors' needs.

The claim of porousness gains greater traction when considering the scale and scope of smuggling. Publishers moved forbidden literature into the Habsburg territories by the horse-drawn cartload. In a letter of March 1832 to Friedrich Brockhaus, Carl Friedrich Wigand, a book dealer in Pressburg, waved off censorship in Hungary as "mild" and "not of much consequence" and ordered hundreds of copies of banned books. Although the Austrian government banned the entire list of Hoffmann & Campe, Julius Campe still managed to ply a lively trade in Austria. In a three-month period in 1843, for example, he sold 6,000 copies of Viktor von Andrian-Werburg's *Österreich und dessen Zukunft*, thus confirming the reports of August Prinz —another Vormärz book dealer—who observed that whole warehouses of forbidden books existed in Vienna. Campe estimated 25 percent of a book's cost to bribe officials. But once invested, books went their merry way. Campe, Brockhaus, Wigand, Reclam, and other publishers smuggled large volumes of printed matter with a confidence, work ethic, and rational calculability that would have pleased Max Weber.

The historian Frank Lorenz Müller recently characterized the Confederation's censorship laws by the mid-1840s as something of a "paper lion": ineffectual statutes. On the one hand, publishers flouted laws—and indeed, the institution of preventive censorship was in disarray by 1845. Publisher's contested state fiats before municipal courts and city councils and often received fair hearings, often receiving full satisfaction or reduced fines and sentences. Prussia proposed a Confederal bill in 1846 to enact post-publication juridical review; and in January 1848, Bavaria actually abolished prepublication review.

On the other hand, the laws still had teeth. Most of the publishers mentioned were imprisoned at some point for trading in illegal books: Campe, Brockhaus, both of the Wigand brothers, Anton Philipp Reclam, Heinrich Hoff, Johann David Sauerländer, Franckh, and J. P. Grohe all served customary sentences of two to three weeks. But the courts often went easy. In Leipzig and Mannheim, they reduced fines to paltry sums and divided jail times into short installments so as not to adversely affect business. Less happily, sentences could also extend to years, as experienced by the Augsburg printer Gottfried Eisenmann, whose constitutionalism landed him 11 years in prison. State government harassment forced the closure of some presses, such as Zacharias Löwenthal and Julius Fröbel's Literarisches Comptoir, and complete bans of a publisher's list was chilling.

Most cases, of course, involved less permanent erasure. In December 1842 the Prussian government banned the sale of the *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, spelling certain economic ruin for the paper. Heinrich and Friedrich Brockhaus, the paper's publishers, had to choose between closing down the paper, thus taking a principled political stance, or recasting it with a more guarded liberal tone. They chose the latter. In doing so, Heinrich wrote in his diary:

> *A newspaper is too weak against a kingdom.... Our newspaper is perhaps in the right, but a ban would only silence us. The weapons are uneven, and it's therefore correct to avoid open war. One can also reach a destination slowly, and where there are no laws, one must be clever.*

THE MOOD AND STRATEGY outlined here encapsulates a motif one might call "shades of gray." For it is the ingenuity in "reaching their destination slowly" and using legal loopholes that characterizes the dogged determination of publishers to maximize their leverage. The media landscape these German publishers forged was far from perfect, short of the freedom for which they clamored. Nevertheless, these communicative arenas entangled Germany in European and global print circuits for good.

True, much was banned, redacted, confiscated, and censored—not to mention self-censored—but it is equally

pertinent to underscore the enormous gains of publishers who pushed back: the accretion of developed political literacies, an articulated ideological landscape, and the anchoring of Western democratic political discourse in German popular culture. Their brazenness ended pre-publication censorship as practiced in the first half of the century, compelling governments to switch tactics and enter into the arena of public opinion as aggressive participants. As a new era of news management and state-sponsored harassment under Otto von Bismarck emerged, their influence endured through the 1860s and into the German Empire, providing arenas for oppositional opinion.

Because overarching interpretations of modern Germany must search for the seeds of illiberalism, scholars treat the cultural bridges between Germany and the Atlantic world as anomalies. But liberal and democratic printers clearly thrived in Germany and produced impressive networks of communication. Exposed to the critical political impulses of the Age of Revolution, these publishers shaped reading constituencies whose regard for constitutional participatory politics is attested not only in the Revolution of 1848–49 but also in the democratic principles of liberal, Catholic, and Social Democratic parties in the German Empire. These interpretive communities, which entwined German letters with other European democratic polities, merit our abiding attention. The legacy of these publishers and their print markets point to a pluralism and diversity in their political culture that only sharpens and intensifies the tragedies of twentieth-century fascism and genocide. □

NIGHT CLAIMS THE GODAVARI

Lives lived beyond ordinariness on the edge of Indian society.

by Kiran Desai

"HINDU VEGETARIAN BREAKFAST," proffered the stewardess, but a cold wind had blown the fog from about the Delhi airport, and before we'd finished, the plane landed, unexpectedly on time. The city was dug up for the new metro, looking subversive, broken. We drove past the sadness of poverty at night, slums of plastic bags barely off the ground, gunnysack doors battened against the freeze. I climbed up the stairs between houses all turned into apartments since my childhood. Where one family had lived there were now mostly eight, with offices in the basement, servants on the roof, underground, atop the water tanks.

HE WAS SINKING; THE BODY GIVES WAY SO FAST.

I climbed to our flat, sure that it remained as always: the inauthentic, but beautiful painting of a blue-robed scholar painted over an old Persian manuscript; my narrow bed with its mattress worn into my childhood shape; the photograph of all of us before we left: two silent brothers, two talkative sisters, and a dog who is smiling, his teeth a shining, grinning star. Our love for him was the love that first taught us about death.

My father was waiting in his brown dressing gown, familiar to me over years, but oddly, he was also wearing gloves and a hat. His smile arrived slowly, as if from far away. Tonics didn't help, nor the homeopathic, the ayurvedic, the herbal. He was sinking; the body gives way so fast, so fast. We lived in hospitals that were in a constantly unsettled state between decay and renovation, thronging with people from all over the third or renegade world—Afghanistan, Iran, Nigeria. Together in a broken parking lot—men and women doing namaaz; sleeping by the defunct fountain; a train station's worth of bedraggled bundles lying about—we waited hour upon hour for the loudspeaker to announce the name of a relative in emergency.

Our family coordinates, first displaced by migration, were being displaced again. This illness—it felt like leaving home in the first place.

When I came back from the hospital, I was quite alone with the family bookshelves. The library now relied on memory and love; to find a book you'd have to have known the titles from before the orange and pale green-blue spines faded. It was still an antidote to open those pages now smelling of tobacco, dust, a mustardy pungency distilled by age.

I remembered how an educated madman living in the ruined seam of a mosque behind our house used to pee an arc under the moon and scream "India-Pakistan—Arrrghaaa!" probably in reference to an anguished journey that never resulted in a home. In the distance, there was still the familiar grinding of trucks driving turnips and cement, chickens and bathroom tiles, across the nation; unsettling the night with the sound of endless, rushing travel.

I read a Marquez story my mother had admired: *The Incredible and Sad Tale of Innocent Eréndira and her Heartless Grandmother.* Exhausted Eréndira, who has labored hard to bathe her fat and terrifying granny, falls asleep with her candle burning, and a wind of misfortune catches flame to the curtain. To repay the debt of the cindered hacienda, she is prostituted across the landscape; she services client after client, but never makes enough; across the desert they go, following men, being followed; the granny-pimp holding a giant cross, and Eréndira in a grand bed carried by porters.

A BIT WOBBLY in the soul, I travelled to coastal Andhra Pradesh, to the delta region of the Godavari river. On the streets of a village we drove through, I noticed an overabundance of beds. Beds being delivered, new old beds, makeshift stage set beds, cheap beds being varnished in the sun, mattresses in the dust. Around this strangeness of beds proliferating, village life seemed as benign as Narayan's *Malgudi* stories, which had created my idea of what it meant to be Indian in this world, in the sweetest incarnation possible. Little shops for cigarettes and sweets; cows wandering; men riding cycles on their way to the banana market by the river's edge, bananas tied to the handlebars, their color macaw-shocking—green and yellow, green and yellow, the greenest green and the yellowiest yellow. Sound of water pouring into pails, out of pails. A jeep going by with some policemen poking their heads out. This world was normal.

Except it was really entirely something else.

The women getting children ready in tiny shorts and mini-ties on elastic bands were all sex workers. The children with their homework were the children of men who stayed five minutes for a "shot." The cycle rickshaw men were pimps who'd found extra business when auto rickshaws drove down their income; the gas station men were also pimps, and so were the *dhaba* men. A 20 percent or 30 percent cut. The truck drivers, the coolies—were clients. Others in the street were "brokers," some three hundred of them. Men coming back with groceries were "temporary husbands." The old lady at her gate was a brothel madam, haggling over the price of girls she was buying from desperately poor parents. Colored Christmas stars over bunga-

lows revealed a missionary drive to save the fallen. The policemen were slowing down, hoping to catch someone soliciting. They'd let her go again in exchange for free sex.

Say "Peddapurum," and every man grins. This is a village of "high-class" sex workers from the Kalavanthalu subcaste, hereditary courtesans and

ANDHRA IS RED EARTH; CHILLIES; VIRILE MOUSTACHES — LUSH, VERDANT, MOIST, AND BLACK.

temple dancers famous for their elegant beauty. Almost every family is involved in the trade. They trace their lineage from the days when they were protected by royalty, priests, and landowners, all the way downhill to a franker prostitution as patronage crumbled in a modernizing India of another shade of morality. "There is still a lot of money in this *dhanda*"—in this business.

The price of a high-class sex worker in Peddapurum: all the way from 200 rupees ($5) a shot and 1500 rupees ($37) for a night to 1000 rupees ($25) a shot and 10,000 rupees ($250) for a night—depending on beauty, fairness of skin. "Shot" always said in English, with movie swagger. All ages were sought after, from teenagers to "auntys"—for younger men feel safer with "auntys," explained a sex worker. And, guffawing hard: "Those policemen are smiling at you because they think maybe you're a new girl with lipstick on especially for them."

Andhra is red earth; chillies; virile moustaches—lush, verdant, moist, and black—on every man's face. A state famous for pickles and chutneys.

"And other hot stuff." Frank humor of women with other women.

"It's the chillies."

"No, it is the music. The beat of the music."

"And who likes the sex?" asks one of the aid workers. "Any of you girls?"

"She! She! She! *She does!*" they point at one woman with frustrated, accusing faces.

The woman begins shouting, "Why do you all say that? *I don't.*"

"*Yes, you do! Admit it.*"

At the moment it seems it will break out into a bitter row, the accused begins to laugh and cover her mouth, and they all convulse into giggles while still attempting to maintain anguished and stern expressions.

The statistics indicate Andhra Pradesh is at the top of the list in people having multiple sexual partners. In rural Andhra Pradesh, 24 percent of men and 9 percent of women claim to indulge themselves beyond the restrictive parameters of marriage, up from the meager national average of 10 percent of men and 2 percent of women.[1]

But I wondered if, more than titillation, Peddapurum proffered home comforts. I had imagined stripy tiger sheets, spooky and suggestive lighting, mirrors in strange places, women posturing with bottoms and breasts first—my naiveté? But there wasn't the slightest attempt at titillation or mystery. The women were in conservative sari blouses, almost no makeup, gold and diamond nose rings and earrings in traditional flower shapes. Peddapurum strove to provide simple middle class contentment on the road.

"We are famous because we are the descendants of courtesans and royalty, so we have that poise, those fine looks," the Kalavanthalu women say.

"No special tricks?"

"No tricks. We are known for our good manners. We treat a man like a king. We'll cook non veg; we'll give oil massages and baths. We turn on the fan. The men bring the whiskey, the McDougal's—but everything else we provide, and when they leave we beg, 'Don't go, please don't, oh, don't go, oh…' —we do all of that play acting. We spoil them."

INSIDE A BROTHEL so high-class they say film stars and even Americans go there was the stuffiness of a middle class home: melamine; fridge; food smells; cabinets full of plastic flowers and china dolls; bed done up in pink with a poster of the Sydney Harbor over it. The only odd thing was that, for privacy, sheets printed with flowers and zebras had been tied across the grill gates, blocking anyone attempting to peep into the compound. The brothel owner, like a prosperous and overly mannered housewife, large tummy spilling over her sari. "Don't even call them sex workers; don't mention prostitution here," I was warned. Her parents were oriented toward each other in the manner of people who'd been married most of their lives, and were finishing lunch *thalis* of rice.

THEY LOOK FOR A GIRL WHO IS BEAUTIFUL AND POOR.

"THERE IS A TEMPLE where the Godavari meets the sea. Here, each year, a Kalavanthalu girl is married to Shiva. That night she spends alone with the deity." This I'm told at a gathering of sex workers training to distribute information about HIV prevention. "Every year they select one girl. Her family is

1 Andhra Pradesh State AIDS Control Society (APSACS), *TRU Behaviour Surveillance Survey*, 2003.

given two, three acres of land by the village council. They look for a girl who is beautiful and poor, so she will fetch a good price and so her family will benefit. The ceremony was just held—on December 11—celebrated lavishly as any wedding by the elders of the Kalavanthalu community. We heard she was bid on for 5 lakhs ($12,500). She spends that night sleeping in the temple; the next day she goes to the man who won the auction for the 'first night.'" "First night" is always said in English. "The girls dance in traditional festival *melas* to advertise themselves. In the old days, they would put a betel leaf in the girl's hand to indicate a future assignment, now they exchange cell phone numbers."

A sex worker named Ragini, charging her phone from a socket behind her chair, tucked it back between her breasts and departed to cook goat curry. "Meat from the legs," she specified, for her "temporary husband" to take with him on a trip to Hyderabad. "Temporary husband" is another English phrase, always uttered with pride at having attracted loyalty within a system conjured for betrayal.

Most Kalavanthalus are no longer married in temples—the symbolic ceremony attempts to bring a whiff of distinguished past, of religious approval, to the present. Mostly they are married off to their father's sister. Marrying deities and banana trees, I'd heard of before, but not one's aunty!

"Yes, the father's sister is the one who gives the *mangalsutra*."

A tremendous amount of discussion about *mangalsutras*. It seems so sad. All the sex workers have this necklace, this sign of a married woman, about their necks. Everywhere you sense a desire for structure and ritual, for normality in lives singularly without it.

"The whole family—grandmother, mother, even the father if he is around—decides who will have 'first night.' The nails are filed; the married uncle gives the toe rings. We do most things just like any other wedding. Three things we do not do. We don't step on each others' feet, which is part of a usual ceremony; we don't shower rice and turmeric over each others' heads; or cumin, jaggery, flowers; we don't bow to the Arundhati star."

One family of sex workers—grandmother, mother, several daughters—proudly displayed each picture in huge albums of the "regular marriage" they had worked to give one daughter, no sign of resentment at the vast cost of this sister's beaming happiness, paid for by the rest of them.

They told me they trace their lineage all the way to the three celestial dancers who tried to distract the sage Vishwamitra from his meditation.

Today, the women dance at fairs to advertise themselves, but in the old days, the first performance was the *gajjela puja*—the anklet *puja*—when a girl, ready for market, danced before the Shiva lingam.

LAXMI SAYS SHE IS 18; SHE LOOKS FAR YOUNGER.

One grey-haired lady took us to the temple where she had performed at the age of 11. Her house is hung with portraits of Jesus, John David (a local missionary), Sai Baba, and a temporary husband. Four good men, all of whom, obviously, could not save her.

But even now, the priest's wife greets her as "sister-in-law" and applies the tika, indicating how much these women are accepted.

"For us, the first man would give the *mangalsutra*. Unless the first man was the *raju*"—the king—she said optimistically. She herself was sold to a *chowdhary*—a landowner—for 500 rupees ($12.50), 55 years ago. He had sex with her for a few days, then left her to solicit.

If they are not married to the deity, or to their aunty, they are married to a sword. At least seven in a group of fifty sex workers claimed this initiation.

"At puberty, I was asked if I preferred marriage or the *dhanda*," said a girl in pink chiffon embroidered with mirrors. "My mother eventually married, but her husband drank, and they were very poor. She learned it was better for a woman to make her own money; no man would support you, you'd just be in the *dhanda* anyway, and supporting him as he drank and visited prostitutes. So at 14, they put the *mangalsutra* first around the sword, then around my neck."

What choice could she have at 14? Of course her mother took the "first night" money. She is a sixth-generation sex worker. "My great-great-great-great-great grandmother was the *dasi* [courtesan] of the king." Her home, which she built herself, is airy, all white, steps rising steeply above the dirt. Even the light appears to be at peace here. Peddapurum is full of proud women, women who build their own homes.

But there are homes and homes. On the other side of Peddapurum, in a dusty patch full of rubbish, lives Laxmi, all alone. She says she is 18, she looks far younger. Laxmi grew up in nearby Kakenada, mother a maid, father a rickshaw puller. A woman from their town took her to Bombay promising to find her work; took her to a club; told her to wait; vanished. A while later, the brothel *seth* entered and informed Laxmi, entirely innocent of sex, that the woman had been paid for Laxmi to work into the future without pay. A police raid uncovered her after a year and sent her home, whereupon she was thrown out by her ashamed parents. She came to Peddapurum.

The "class" girls don't talk to her, she says; they resent others muddying the famous Kalavanthalu name; they have glamour and "color," name themselves Kareena Kapoor and Sonali Bendre after film stars, without it seeming absurd; they leave the brothel only if a client sends for them in an air-conditioned Maruti car—otherwise you never see them.

Her friend Sridevi comes over to share a bit of winter sun. Sridevi's mother is a brothel madam, and while she takes a 50 percent cut on the girls who work for her—or takes them on contract, paying their parents, say, 10,000 rupees ($250) for two to three months of their daughters' sex work—with her own daughter she can recoup 100 percent of the girl's earnings. Sridevi seems too overcome by this simple sense to be resentful. About her neck: a Virgin Mary in gold. They are both Christian converts.

"Do you go to church?"

"How can we go to church?" they laugh. "We are prostitutes!"

Opposite, they say, lives a girl with a temporary husband who stays with her because her earnings allow him to play cards: "He blows 1000 rupees ($25) a time."

For love, or at least company, they will support married men, drunks, gamblers.

No simple emotions result. One woman said she had sex once with a man who, ever since, has sat outside her door crying. But she has a temporary husband as well as clients. "One of them I love, and one I cannot bear to see sad." How to work one's heart out of that predicament? So the man who cries continues to cry.

Another woman, you can see how beautiful she must have been once—before she desperately slashed her arms and wrists upon seeing her temporary husband flirt with another girl.

When we visit Ragini (preparer of the goat curry) in her village of Dowleswaram, thirty kilometers from Peddapurum, it turns out her temporary husband is also her blood uncle. A child, who must be 12 or 13, is sitting in Ragini's lap; like sisters they have their arms about each other. The girl ran away from home with a man who seduced her with stories of love and then sold her to Ragini's mother, the haggard, unsmiling owner of one of five brothels near a cinema house. They tell me of another child forced into sex work by her parents to earn her own dowry. She'd marry and hope her husband would never uncover the truth.

Generations of struggle, and this is what they have: one trunk; a few battered pots; an ancient, dusty, cloth umbrella; a black-and-white TV, picture wavering, from the first days of television; a few cosmetics, safety pins, a toothbrush lying on the earth; all in a hovel of ruined thatch and mud, more sieve than shelter, two dark holes into which they carry a mat should a client appear.

In homes all over the district, secret housewife sex workers wait for their cell phones to ring. One woman and her daughter-in-law transform their home into a brothel as soon as the son and husband leave for work. "There is so much demand, and not everyone can afford a Kalavanthalu."

"Do the men know?"

"They don't know, or maybe they know and don't ask. You see, they can't earn enough to pay the bills."

THEIR CLIENTS ARE STUDENTS, daily wage laborers, stone cutters, fishermen, factory workers, hawkers, farmers, port workers, coolies, sari purchasing businessmen, plant nursery men, Oil and Natural Gas Commission men, water engineers who work at the barrage, the military and navy, sailors from China, South Africa, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Madras—ships docking for weeks sometimes, transporting urea from Nagarajuna Fertilizers, sugar from Deccan Sugars, rice, smuggled DVD players, imported beer, and "drugs!"—the women assure me.

Brokers arrive in towns like Peddapurum; take the girls out to the ships in little boats. The captains get the Kalavanthalu girls. The drudge sailors get Laxmi or Sridevi. "We depend on sign language, don't understand what they say, but we like to go—they pay us with lipstick, perfume, and dollars."

OUR HOTEL, by the side of the Godavari river, offers a "torpedo deck" for business conferences and "mind-boggling water slides" in a water park, "a scintillating place to while away your time with the near and dear ones." It is full of businessmen on their own and they are mostly at the bar above the Captain's Table. It is painted brightly in an attempt to be jaunty, but nothing can rid it of a flavor of something else. Tinted glass in the windows; mosquitoes coming at you through slowly swirling cigarette smoke. The night has claimed the Godavari.

A nice waiter says: "No, no no, oh no, we don't make tandoori, as nobody asks for it and if you want continental, it will take twice as long, as, you see, continental takes so much longer to cook." And so we are all eating the same fish curry, with not enough liquor to drown out this diseased gloom, and any attempt to lighten things sinks one deeper, because of course, the truth is that there is something else going on in this bright, rich India. This taking-off India, this rising giant, this Incredible India!—seems heavy. Eastern Europeans, men from Japan and Hong Kong, Russians, American *desis*—they are travelling, the news is spreading, they have arrived for it—and the new India is often nowhere.

In the rooms, hotel TVs play music videos that show half-clad bodies, tongues and fingers doing gasping, grasping things.

On the highway, truckers go barreling through the void, their minds becoming convinced of rumors. *If you sleep with a virgin and a donkey, you won't get AIDS*.

And in the dark, by the side of the road, invisible women are signalling with torches. "We'll go into the jungle."

Enough of several languages to say this much. Of about six million truckers and helpers, 30–34 percent of them have commercial sex.[2] Two million truckers may be on the road, away from their homes, for as long as one to two months at a time—away from their homes.

Andhra Pradesh is the Indian state with the third largest number of migrants. Sex workers cater to them, but they are also part of this migration, travelling to towns like Peddapurum to work off its fame, travelling so they

2 Family Health International (FHI), Department for International Development (DfID), *Healthy Highways Behavioural Surveillance Survey*, August 2000.

might be anonymous, travelling to urban centers where women from coastal Andhra are considered desirable, madams dropping off girls in Bombay, Hyderabad, Chennai, Goa, for lucrative contract work—20,000 to 30,000 rupees ($500–750) a month. Of sex workers from East Godavari, 95.4 percent have moved once; 90.4 percent have moved at least twice.[3]

We travel more; the world grows lonelier and bigger; a disease like AIDS waits for the spaces between us, for people displaced, for so many not travelling in the way of shiny advertising, whose journeys are not about freedom and pleasure in the wide world—but about being squeezed into a small place. In the past, there were repressive regimes; there was slavery, the Holocaust—terrible methods of dehumanization. In today's world, we have bitter patterns of migration, of illegality. Refugees and exiles of war and poverty, moving from rural landscapes to urban centers, from poor countries to rich countries—the kind of journey that undoes one's spiritual, one's personal place in the world, making anyone uprooted from home exchangeable with anyone else, leading to betrayal in myriad forms, economic to sexual.

AIDS IS FLAMING DOWN THESE HIGHWAYS.

OFF THE HIGHWAY, a group of women carry a folded examining table, a sterilized speculum, a flashlight, and a broom, into a derelict weed-filled compound belonging to the forest department. They are followed by a young doctor, an ophthalmologist. "But this is my interest," she smiles. How many would volunteer for this? Two times a month, they gather up the women scattered on the highway, searching for "hot spots" near petrol pumps, eating stalls. Sometimes they find forty to sixty women, or twenty to 25. The HIV prevalence among female sex workers in East Godavari is reported at 26.3 percent,[4] compared to 1.25 percent in the general population.[5] They do not automatically do HIV testing in these clinics, as they do not offer treatment, and the logic is simple: how would anyone survive a loss of livelihood, a life of pus and ruin, if you offer no medicines and no alternate income?

Yet, on the other hand, the cost of discretion: AIDS is flaming down these highways. Four to ten clients a night, sometime twenty, sometimes forty. More traffic on festival days. Pongal, for example, when women traditionally visit their mothers' homes.

"Don't you get tired?"

"When I see the money, I don't get tired."

Many of the women are balding, with weeping sores, blisters ringing their mouths. Some with a dullness about their beings, an inside-out look to their eyes, as if they are gazing beyond the highway, the table with the speculum in the ruined hut, and the broom by the side of the rubbish it has just swept up. Who would pay to have sex with them? They are checked for STIs, given condoms, released back to the highway.

IF YOU HAVE SEX with a *Dommarisani*—a sex worker from the Dommari street acrobat community—your crops will be good and you will be healthy all year.

"Wives invite us in for their husbands."

Some of the women in this highway clinic are skilled in somersaults and back flips. They can slither up a perpendicular stick and revolve in the air, balanced on a single point. Through summer they travel from village to village in a caravan, performing. In winter, they make palm mats to sell—we are sitting on them now. They come from nomadic communities now settled into villages like Chilakaluripet in Guntur district. The women are forced to have sex for free, and the community is paid collectively from the village fund.

"The men?"

"Men don't work in their community," the outreach workers say matter-of-factly. Yamini tells me she was performing gymnastics when a mechanic gave her parents 300 rupees ($7.50) for first sex.

But they insist other sex workers exist in much more desolate vulnerability. Such as the women by the sea.

Eight women, holding used rice sacks, work from a sliver of jungle between the highway and a flat, dead-looking ocean; middle-aged women with heavy bodies. Jayati began at twenty, when her husband abandoned her and their children. She's been here every day for 15 years, working for 50 rupees ($1.20) a shot. There are no brokers, for there is no money to be made off these women. But a merry toddy seller has set up his stall near them, a frothy, batty expression on his face. The women come out of the forest like refugees, tentative, shy—then in a rush of affection and eagerness—ready for photographs, jokes, to tell absolutely everything. They pull me by the hand down the network of paths, to shallow pits in the sand. "This is how." One woman lies down on her rice sack—an old, fat, sad woman lying in a pit among plastic packets, cigarettes scattered about, with legs spread, sari pushed aside to reveal breasts poking up. A lifetime of this, and each year she will be more worn; the rash will spread like a fungus; the sari will have more holes and stains; she will have more

3 [Indian] Population Council, "The Patterns and Drivers of Migration and Mobility of Sex Workers and Male Migrant Workers on the Move and Examining the Links with HIV Risk" (2008).

4 "Integrated Behavioural and Biological Assessment, Round 1 (2005–2007)," in *National Interim Summary Report: India* (New Delhi: Indian Council of Medical Research and Family Health International 360, 2007).

5 [Indian] National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, "HIV Fact Sheets Based on HIV Sentinel Surveillance Data, 2003–2006" (November 2007).

gray in her hair, more wrinkles—and her price will drop.

As the stories mount in an overwhelming tidal wave of disaster, I think of the sadness and defeat inherent in feminism, the humiliation of waving a banner: "Well, I believe women should earn as much as men, and men should help with housework etc."—when men from Oslo to Rajamundry are walking out the back door, in fact, out of the front door, to seek out girls sold for less than the cost of a bottle of beer.

Yet these women have not succumbed. Their friendship gives them dignity. They used to suffer terrible violence, they say, drunken men in gangs coming to the forest, demanding certain angles, postures, roughing them up. A sex worker can't go to the police.

The lady who runs the center that opened to help them presents herself as an ordinary middle-class woman, in sari and glasses—but she is extraordinary enough to travel away from her cricketer husband and her son to protect the women from thugs in this desolate place. The sex workers at least have each other, their children, and their toddy friend coasting upon his personal wave. She lives in one dim-lit room at the unbuilt edge of town; no company for a woman like her here. She invites us in; the emptiness gapes; nobody about in the silent night; and not even a television. One cannot overestimate her chosen loneliness.

"Do you use condoms?" she asks, seriously, but with a sort of introverted humor.

"Yes, yes, yes!" The jungle sex workers pull out the packets from between their breasts and wave them madly like flowers in a festival.

There is buoyancy about this answer that suggests the truth may be otherwise. This is so we can all be happy together. Some 76 percent of sex workers from East Godavari report consistent condom usage,[6] but what happens when women like these are on their own, negotiating out of hunger and debt, dropping their price, as even the climate conspires against them? In the monsoon, they say, they go from 50 rupees ($1.25) to 25 rupees ($0.63) to 15 rupees ($0.38)—anything to pay their rent. Go out with their sacks over their heads in vicious rain.

Then, their voices suddenly hush. They are not the most desolate of sex workers, they tell me. There are mythic creatures of misfortune that actually exist—doomed creatures even the sex workers hesitate to speak of, as if doing so would make it impossible to continue their own lives with any life spirit. These are the *yoginis*: branded witches, chased to the outskirts of the village, often widows whose property is then stolen by greedy relatives. They are considered communal property, free for any man to enjoy. "But not common here. Inland. In Karnataka..."

HIS POOR MIND WAS SEEKING THE REFUGE OF IMAGINATION.

THE MORNING I LEFT, I woke up early. At first light, the Godavari river is the color of widowhood, a final departure.

Spilling over sand banks, it is wide enough, pale enough to soothe difficult human emotions, to suggest a journey more peaceful than this earthly one. Many people are gathered here, staring out.

Some buffaloes interrupt the scene, though, swimming out to a grassy island. A priest sat on the bank, in the sun, in front of the over pink Krishna Consciousness Center, amid washermen washing, washing; so much washing going on, it seemed a metaphor for cleaning deeper things. He said there was a Telugu saying that translated: "Well, you go all the way to work so as to eat, and by the time you've come all the way home, you've undone the food in your tummy."

Turning away from the water, the landscape is overrun by red again.

"The beloved may absent herself from existence, but love does not," John Berger quotes Naguib Mafouz, while meditating on the emotion of the color red.

"Could it be that red is the one color," he wonders, "that is continually asking for a body?" That refers always to the human form? The emotional music of love and the end of love blares from every truck. River, sea, road travel beyond the eye's horizon. Coconut palms reach extravagantly all to the right or all to the left.

And a delicate sex worker sings in Kakenada, "Why aren't you singing? Why aren't you singing to my eyes? To fill the vacuum my heart cannot express."

MY FATHER, now sadly diagnosed with cancer, opened one wise eye when I saw him again in his hospital bed. The nurses, he told me, were really skilled actresses, temple dancers being trained by the government toward a new vocation. Every evening they had put on a play, he said, philosophical discourses, songs—and he watched for hours; he got no sleep. Their unusual talent, he felt, might take them all the way to England. His poor mind was seeking the refuge of imagination.

What I had seen, really seen, were lives lived with the intensity of art; rife with metaphor, raw, distilled. The emotions of love and friendship, you'd assume would be missing or rotten, in these communities—existing even more so for their being sought amid illegality, fragmentation, and betrayal. These were lives lived beyond ordinariness, insisting on a personal story, not exchangeable with any other. "Tell each one properly," said the women in the jungle by the ocean. □

6 "Integrated Behavioral and Biological Assessment, Round 1 (2005–2007)" (see note 4).

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

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

LaToya Ruby Frazier

Portfolio

Braddock, Pennsylvania, is located on the Monongahela River, nine miles east of Pittsburgh. It is where Andrew Carnegie decided to build his first public library and his first steel mill, the Edgar Thomson Works. Once a bustling home to over 20,000 people, Braddock is now inhabited by 2,000 predominately elderly, ill, underemployed working-class residents. For the last decade, LaToya Ruby Frazier has been documenting her family and the withering of industry in her hometown. Frazier (b.1982), her mother (b.1959), and her Grandma Ruby (1925–2009) have collectively witnessed the prosperity of the early twentieth century, white flight in the 1950s and 1960s, the collapse of the steel industry in the 1970s, and the war on drugs in the 1980s and 1990s. A century of pollution has left a toxic legacy: Grandma Ruby died of pancreatic cancer; Frazier's mother suffers from an unknown neurological disorder and cancer; and Frazier was diagnosed with lupus 13 years ago. Braddock Hospital, once the hub of treatment and Braddock's largest employer, was demolished in 2010. A new, $250-million facility was built in a nearby affluent suburb. Frazier's forthcoming book, *The Notion of Family*, she writes, "tells the story of economic globalization and the decline of manufacturing through the bodies of three generations of African-American women." It will be published in fall 2014 by the Aperture Foundation.


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

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[1] Huxtables, Mom and Me, 2009 [2] Grandma Ruby and Me, 2005 [3] Momme Portrait Series (Shadow), 2008 [4] Self-Portrait (March 10 AM), 2009 [5] Mom's Friend Mr. Yerby, 2005 [6] Aunt Midgie and Grandma Ruby, 2007 [7] Grandma Ruby and U.P.M.C. Braddock Hospital on Braddock Avenue, 2007 [8] Mr. Jim Kidd, 2011 [9] Fifth Street Tavern and U.P.M.C. Braddock Hospital on Braddock Avenue, 2011

BOOMERS

The transformation of the US Army, courtesy of atoms and Elvis.

by Brian McAllister Linn

SINCE the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the greatest debate within the American national security community has centered on the nature of the post-Cold War military environment. Both civilian and military authorities generally concede that the US armed forces must radically change—or "transform"—to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. For the last two decades many of the loudest voices in the "transformation debate" are those who assert that an "information age revolution in military affairs" has rendered most, if not all, earlier military concepts obsolete. These advocates argue there are obvious historical parallels between recent developments in information technology—computers, satellites, digital communications, and so forth—and the three previous military revolutions inspired by gunpowder, the internal combustion engine, and the atomic bomb. More extreme advocates have claimed that if the United States transforms its armed forces to take advantage of the information revolution, it will be able to wage rapid, decisive, and cheap wars, and maintain global dominance in the twenty-first century.

In 1996, the US Department of Defense placed the information revolution at the center of something called Vision 2010: a massively transformative plan for the post-Cold War American armed forces. Vision 2010 portrayed a future battlefield in which small, dispersed American military organizations using "information age" technology annihilated much larger but less advanced enemy military forces, all the while remaining virtually invulnerable to counterattack. This ideal of a rapid, decisive, and surgically precise future battlefield significantly influenced the Bush administration's conduct of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it still shapes the recent Department of Defense's strategic guidance, which asserts that the United States "is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war, and, therefore, [requires] a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced." Whereas the pre-Iraq/Afghanistan vision was one of unlimited faith that transformation would allow smaller American military forces to wage rapid, decisive, and cheap wars, the vision now appears to be that transformation will allow the nation's armed forces to recover from the overstretch of the last decade.

Contrary to the claims of some defense analysts, history does not actually provide specific lessons suitable for ready application by today's policymakers. But history can inform our understanding of current affairs, providing both examples and analytical frameworks to better understand causes and consequences. In the past, advocates sought to establish an almost lineal connection with World War II's blitzkrieg. Today, however, if

military and civilian policymakers are seeking a historical case of both the potential and dangers of military transformation, there is no better case than the US Army's attempt in the 1950s to create the equipment, concepts, and organization to allow it to wage atomic warfare.

DURING the early Cold War, atomic weapons and nuclear conflict were so much a part of American everyday life and imagination that they were subjects in children's comic books. For scientific research and funding it was a boom time. But for the US Army, the atomic bomb was a disaster. Convinced that nuclear weapons provided cheap and total security, the American public and its political representatives slashed the Army's budgets and personnel, leaving it with aging and obsolete World-War-II equipment, scattered across the globe in occupation garrisons. It was given virtually no role in any future war with the Soviet Union. And though the Korean War led to the US Army almost tripling its personnel, it was a frustrating war of attrition that did not result in a clear victory. In most ways the war did little to improve the army's prestige.

When he became president, in 1953, former Army general Dwight D. Eisenhower declared he intended to give a "New Look" to national security: both improving US defenses and slashing skyrocketing military expenditures. He was determined the United States would fight no more Koreas—by which he meant no more long, bloody, indecisive land wars against Soviet proxies. Instead, in the event of Russian provocation, the United States would unleash its full nuclear arsenal in an all-out attack on Soviet cities and industry. To enforce this doctrine of "massive retaliation," Eisenhower funded an increase in the nuclear arsenal and a new generation of intercontinental bombers and missiles. But the New Look also cut the US Army's budget, slashed manpower almost in half, and gave the service virtually no role beyond policing the American public.

The US Army leadership, of course, viewed the New Look as an existential threat, and it actively worked to undermine the change. Army intellectuals argued that short of a direct attack on the continental United States, American policymakers would never unleash the nation's strategic nuclear arsenal for fear the Soviets would turn Washington, New York, and other cities into radioactive ash. Knowing that massive retaliation was a bluff, the Soviets would build up their conventional forces and eventually invade Western Europe, quickly conquering West Germany and much of France. Unable to halt the massed Soviet tank columns, the United States would have the impossible choice of dropping atomic bombs on its allies, killing millions of civilians, or accepting Communist control of Western Europe, leading to the regime's global supremacy. Having dismissed the New Look as a deterrent, Army intellectuals focused instead on how much smaller NATO and American land forces could defeat a Soviet invasion.

Army tacticians, in response, argued that mobile, dispersed American forces equipped with new technology could actually avoid the Soviet armored columns and then destroy them with small-yield (1-to-50-kiloton) atomic warheads. This scenario—known as Tactical Atomic War, or Limited Atomic War—allowed the US Army to assert that it was the only armed force that could prevent nuclear holocaust. This vision of Limited Atomic War became a key part of the transformation program of a key figure of the era: Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor.

Like many senior officers, Taylor believed the New Look might destroy the Army's ability to wage war. But his own survey research showed that Eisenhower's policies reflected the views of the public and its political representatives. The solution, in Taylor's view, was to "sell the Army" to the American public—to make the citizens realize the service was a modern, efficient, and effective force that could fight atomic war without nuclear annihilation. As a result, Taylor's transformation initiative was in many ways as much about public relations as about military effectiveness. In this context, everything relating to transformation—from the design of the officer's uniform to the development of an atomic missile—was worthy of the Chief's attention.

One of Taylor's first steps was to reorganize the Army's combat divisions into "Pentomic Divisions"—a name he admitted was inspired by a Madison Avenue-like wish to market the Army's ability to fight atomic war. He also authorized radical changes in Army technology with the purpose of expanding the atomic arsenal and providing increased mobility. Perhaps most notable was replacing much of the artillery with atomic-capable missiles and rockets. Under Taylor's direction, the US Army's research and development budget for missiles in fiscal year 1958 was $170 million. In contrast, only $10 million was allotted to artillery. In the following fiscal year, missiles accounted for 40 percent of the Army's budget for weapons and equipment. To provide more prestige and publicity for its atomic missile program, the Army drew up a special insignia displaying a helmeted soldier, atomic helix, and rocket, displayed on a pentagram background to symbolize the new Pentomic Division.

For much of the 1950s, the Army's transformation to atomic-war readiness appeared not only possible but also successful. In 1950, it began serious development of a long-range cannon that fired a shell with the destructive impact of the Nagasaki bomb (21 kilotons; 7050 degrees Fahrenheit; 624 mph winds). A primary justification for this project was to target Soviet armored columns in Europe. In 1953, a 280mm cannon, nicknamed "Atomic Annie," fired an atomic warhead in a spectacular public relations event, and within two years a battery of these super weapons had been deployed to Europe. During the 1950s the Army also unveiled, with great fanfare, an arsenal of atomic-capable missiles with nicknames such as Honest John, Little John, Redstone, and Corporal, all intended to provide an atomic umbrella for the dispersed, mobile units harassing Soviet aggressors.

The logical extension of the atomic arsenal was the Davy Crockett, so small and mobile it could be transported and fired by a three-man jeep unit. By 1960 the US Army could put the equivalent of a Hiroshima-size bomb in the hands of an infantry company.

For as radical as the 1950s arsenal was, Taylor and others saw it as just the first wave of even more transformational technology that was to include an armada of vehicles with self-fueling engines, energy weapons, and impervious armor. Project 80, a 1958 study to determine the weapons and tactics of the future, envisioned that within twenty years there would be no battle lines—just perhaps a dozen or so vehicles (ground and air) engaging Soviet columns at ranges up to 20,000 meters, with everything from atomics to machine guns.

All told, the US Army of the 1950s had "transformed" itself from the one that fought against fascism in World War II with foot soldiers, tanks, and planes, to one now prepped for ground-based atomic war with futuristic weapons. It also initiated revolutionary changes in doctrine (Limited Atomic War), organization (the Pentomic Division), and new technology (rockets, atomics).

Despite its sweeping and impressive vision, the entire plan failed within a year of Taylor's retirement. One 1963 Army public-relations survey concluded the plan had gone "overboard" and "tried to find room for the Army on the massive retaliation bandwagon. . . . In hindsight, we can see now that in pressing our claims to these rather unnatural missions, we diverted public attention and scarce resources from our traditional primary role of seizing and holding ground." The Army had still not recovered from the effects of its flirtation with atomic war when it was deployed to Vietnam.

THE 1950s "Atomic Army" experiment failed for a number of reasons, but the primary cause was one that has been virtually ignored by both military and civilian transformation advocates: how to recruit, train, and retain the "atomic soldier."

Army planners, most of them products of the pre-World War II peacetime force, recognized they could not fill the new Atomic Army with the same marginal men who had filled the army's ranks for the previous 150 years: men who often had less than a sixth-grade education, few technical skills, and, when not under strict military discipline, were prone to drinking, fighting, and getting into trouble. Planners recognized the Atomic Army didn't just need soldiers who were tough in combat; it needed soldiers who were educated, innovative, and motivated, with the skills to use a computer, repair a rocket's electronic guidance system, and fill out requisition forms in triplicate.

The Atomic Army placed unprecedented demands on administrative and technical personnel. Clerks, computer operators, and other paper shufflers became as pervasive as infantrymen. In 1955, US Army Europe Headquarters processed 22,000 messages in one 12-hour shift: one cable was nine pages long and took 18 hours to type and ten hours to process. The demands for technical specialists to maintain and use the complicated equipment Taylor's initiative called for was equally great. In 1956, on any day there were 30,000 personnel (or 3 percent of the entire Army) undergoing technical specialist training at one of the service's 150 schools. Yet an equal percentage of Army personnel were functionally illiterate, and another 3 percent had not even completed grade school. The Army was simultaneously training microwave repair experts and teaching rudimentary spelling.

The Korean War tripled the size of the US Army. More importantly, however, it changed the Army personnel system from one based on voluntary enlistment to one based on conscripts who served a two-year tour of duty. The repercussions of this were truly transformational—far beyond those caused by doctrine, organization, and technology. The draft meant that any time during the 1950s about 30 percent of Army-enlisted personnel were either entering or leaving the service. Since much of the Army's most essential specialist training in missiles or electronics took thirty or more weeks, this meant that by the time a draftee had been processed and then undergone basic and specialist training, he had only a few months to perform the mission the Army had trained him for. One study found that in such skilled positions the Army got the same level of effective performance from one three-year enlistee as it did from four two-year draftees. The obvious solution was to reserve high-skilled technical positions for volunteers, thus encouraging recruiting of skilled personnel and getting more of their service. But this impacted the morale and training of the combat forces. Because it took only some 16 weeks to train an infantry or armor-branch soldier, the combat units filled up with short-service draftees while the volunteer technical specialists and career soldiers remained in support, maintenance, and administrative positions.

If the draftees' short service was one source of the Atomic Army's personnel problems, its career soldiers were another. As a means of encouraging high quality, the Army insisted that for any soldier to re-enlist he had to be promotable to non-commissioned officer (a so-called NCO). Unfortunately, in World War II and the Korean War, thousands of soldiers were quickly promoted to NCO rank to fulfill immediate personnel vacancies. In 1954, a soldier could jump from the lowest to the highest NCO rank in little more than three years. Most of these high-ranking NCOs remained in the service and re-enlisted. More than any other group, they were the human face of the Atomic Army, typified by popular culture figures like TV's Sergeant Ernest J. Bilko, the do-nothing, rear-echelon career soldier who had managed to find a comfortable posting, simply collecting a salary at the taxpayer's expense, and Sergeant Orville Snorkel, from the comic strip *Beetle Bailey*, who undermined the Army system with his stupidity, brutality, and poor leadership skills.

A 1955 survey revealed that 65 percent of enlisted men had little or no respect for their NCOs, and that only

4 percent of the officers rated their NCOs as "adequate." Army educational reports consistently revealed that NCOs were deemed to be "Category IV" (functionally illiterate) in disproportionately high numbers and had disproportionately low levels of education. Many could not read technical manuals or lead combat units, and they tended to congregate in low-skill jobs in supply, cooking, transport, or, perhaps worst of all, training the draftees or supervising soldiers in meaningless duties.

Throughout the 1950s, when both draftees and first-term volunteers were surveyed about why they would not re-enlist, the most common single reason was not food, physical hardship, low pay, or bad working conditions—it was bad leadership. What was the Army to do with these marginal soldiers—especially those who remained in the service? One solution was for the Army to dumb down its technical instruction. One manual, Preventative Service, was in a comic book designed for soldiers with the equivalent of an eighth-grade education and featuring the voluptuous "Connie Rodd," who explained such basic precautions as engaging the tank's safety brake before working on its transmission.

But the Atomic Army was also faced with another big task in mid-twentieth-century America: how to socially indoctrinate a new generation of recruits into the military virtues of patriotism, morality, and discipline. But this was not only because so many of the troops were unwilling participants. It was rather because military officers and much of the public believed that American society—its schools, churches, and civic leaders—were failing to teach young people the virtues that had made the military—and America—great. With other social institutions shirking their patriotic duty in favor of, in part, the shiny new world of consumer goods available to the burgeoning middle class, the Army became the "last hope" of socializing the American male teenager. ▷

WHEN he was drafted into the US Army, in 1958, 22-year-old Elvis Aron Presley, US # 53310761, had been singing and performing for just four years. He was already an international sensation and already a Cold War icon, having the distinction of being condemned by both communists and conservatives. He had just made two controversial movies, *Jailhouse Rock* and *King Creole*, in which he played a juvenile delinquent fighting against authority. But in barely two years, the US Army re-made Elvis Presley. It made him respectable, moral, and patriotic, symbolized best by the last scene of *G.I. Blues*, where the erstwhile rebel stands in full uniform, saluting a giant American flag. Fans and scholars of social history agree that it was Elvis's military service, more than anything, that made him a working class icon.

By joining the Army, cutting his hair, and doing his duty, Elvis proved he was not only patriotic but that he was also just a typical American boy who never let fame detract from basic decency. But like much of Taylor's transformation initiative and "Pentomic Division," Elvis's military service was also a public relations campaign, a conscious effort by both the Army and Presley's management team to "sell" the star and the service to the American public, and especially to teenagers. The Army planned for "Operation Elvis" with the attention usually reserved for military campaigns, assigning over a dozen public relations officers to draw up detailed schedules and protocols and to coordinate with the media and Presley's advisors. Presley's induction was a news event, and photographers documented his receiving vaccines, taking the oath, and, most memorable, sacrificing his famous pompadour to an Army barber. (In truth, Elvis had already had a hairdresser give him a haircut that met Army requirements.)

Elvis's arrival in Germany, where he was to be stationed, horrified conservatives and inspired teenagers. The rock-n-roll outlaw proved was a good ambassador for the US in Germany. He went out to meet fans who appeared outside his quarters and was always agreeable to photographs and signatures. When the US Army had to move a German memorial honoring World War I dead, they sent Elvis to participate as a sign of respect. Throughout his service, Presley was "officially" photographed only in roles that emphasized that his military experience was the same as every other enlisted draftee.

Elvis went out with his unit when it trained, and he did some very hard duty. He served in the Third Armored Division, an elite combat unit, at a time of great Soviet-American tension over Berlin—tension that would escalate into the "Berlin Crisis" only a few months after he left. Had war occurred, the most conservative estimates, based on war games, were two million dead almost immediately and millions more dead in the coming weeks. Elvis, and all those who served at that time, faced dangers that today's military—and today's academics—can hardly even imagine. His risk increased his appeal.

The 1960 film *G.I. Blues*, which in Germany is titled *Kaffe Europa*, is emblematic of Elvis and the Army in many ways—marking the transformation of Elvis from the rebellious delinquent of *Jailhouse Rock* to the fun-loving but decent all-American boy he played in virtually every subsequent movie. The repackaging of Elvis for *G.I. Blues* was the result of close cooperation between the studio, Elvis's managers, and the US Army. Each wanted to connect Elvis to the Army, to demonstrate that Elvis and the Army were both military and moral, and to publicize Elvis and the Army's role as ambassadors in Germany. All these agendas came together in a scene where Elvis sings a Swabian folk song, "Wooden Heart" (in German, "*Muss i denn?*"), with a blond-haired German marionette to children at a puppet show—winning over both German civilians and the girl.

Elvis rarely spoke about his military experience. But two interviews he gave are significant, not only because of what they tell us about Elvis but because of what they tell us about the attitudes of the majority of soldiers during the Army's Atomic Age Transformation. In interviews before his induction, Elvis stressed that he intended to follow orders and do his duty. In an interview immediately after his return to Memphis, he was asked what advice he would give teenagers about to enter the service. His response—play along, don't stand out, do your time—might have been echoed by tens of thousands of other citizen-soldiers.

And this response illustrates the essential dilemma of the mid-twentieth-century Army: Taylor's transformation initiative was dependent on the Pentomic organization, an arsenal of atomic weapons, and a doctrine of limited atomic war—but it was even more dependent on an "Atomic Army" of highly motivated, skilled, selfless, dedicated technician-warriors who were completely committed to executing its ideal of Limited Atomic War. It needed soldiers able to repair missiles and operate computers, who were disciplined and fearless enough to charge into the searing blast of an atomic bomb. What it got were soldiers like Elvis Presley, whose attitude to military service remained at best one of passive acceptance, at worse one of passive aggression.

Those who served in Elvis's Army did not protest openly, as some of their successors would do in the 1960s, but they resisted both the Army and its ideal of atomic warfare in a far more insidious fashion: by refusing to reenlist. One indirect result of this refusal was that much of Taylor's transformation agenda was repudiated. A far more ominous legacy was the Army's conduct of the war in Vietnam, and the service's soon-toxic relations with its draftees. For today's promoters of military transformation agendas—agendas that are based only on technology, concepts, and organization—it would be wise to remember one essential truth: is it humans, not weapons, who wage war. □

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

NOTEBOOK

News from the Hans Arnhold Center

David M. Rubenstein speaks with Hillary Rodham Clinton at the Inauguration of the Richard C. Holbrooke Forum in the European Sculpture wing of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, December 3, 2014. Photo © Brian Palmer.

Michael Ignatieff

INAUGURATING THE RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE FORUM

On the evening of December 4, 2013, the American Academy in Berlin launched the Richard C. Holbrooke Forum for the Study of Diplomacy and Governance with a 220-guest gala dinner at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Welcoming remarks by Academy Chairman A. Michael Hoffman were followed by a screening of David Holbrooke's film-in-progress about his late father. Former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was then interviewed by David M. Rubenstein. As Clinton remarked, "Richard's personality, which was by any description outsized, took some people a little aback. He was a force of nature.... That was sometimes disconcerting to colleagues in the government, but Richard was absolutely unfazed."

Holbrooke's approach to diplomacy inspired the Forum, which will take the form of a series of working groups on topics of global concern. The chairperson will render Holbrooke's "method" into frank discourse across disciplinary lines, question conventional wisdom, and encourage the sort of startling insights for which Holbrooke was known.

The gala's stage also welcomed scholar Michael Ignatieff, former US Ambassador to Germany Philip D. Murphy, and journalist Kati Marton, who articulated her hopes for the Forum named for her late husband: "The essence of Richard, his brand of diplomacy—which was really problem-solving—will continue on," Marton said. "That is what the Holbrooke Forum in Berlin will distill and analyze and, most importantly, pass on to the next generation of policymakers and diplomats." Marton also thanked Vincent A. Mai, Peter G. Peterson and Joan Ganz Cooney, and David M. Rubenstein, who chaired the dinner, and acknowledged the generous support of Steven Rattner and Maureen White, Eric E. Schmidt, and the Kellen and Arnhold families. "Thank you all for remembering Richard," she said.

The gala raised more than $3 million, and the Forum's first two working groups will convene in 2014. The first, Statecraft and Responsibility, co-chaired by Michael Ignatieff and Harold Hongju Koh, will examine the consequences of globalization for the reallocation of responsibility in a "post-Western" world order. The second, The Legal Advisers' Project, to take place later this year, will explore how national cultures can adapt their differing legal processes to approach common international law-making challenges.

For more information please visit *holbrookeforum.org*.

James Wolfensohn, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Christopher Hill


Steven Rattner, Tammy Murphy, A. Michael Hoffman


Kati Marton


Jeffrey A. Rosen, Andrew Gundlach


Gahl Hodges Burt


A. Michael Hoffman, Gary Smith


Philip D. Murphy, Henry Arnhold


Vali Nasr, Rina Amiri, Maureen White

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RELUCTANT HEGEMONS

The seeming reticence of two major world powers—the United States and Germany—was the focus of a panel discussion hosted by the American Academy at the Roosevelt House at Hunter College, in New York City, on the afternoon of December 4, 2013. The discussion, conceived of and moderated by longtime Academy trustee Josef Joffe of *Die Zeit*, addressed an issue at the core of the Richard C. Holbrooke Forum.

The panel was comprised of Michael Ignatieff, Nader Mousavizadeh, Vali Nasr, Michael Schaefer, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. They were joined by an audience that included Harold Hongju Koh, Padma Desai, Jagdish Bagwhati, Maureen White, Gahl Hodges Burt, Roger Cohen, and several dozen others. The following is an excerpt from their discussion.

Joffe: The topic, reluctant hegemons, came to me when I looked at these two countries, Germany and the United States, which are both the last man standing in their particular arena: the US in the global arena, and Germany in the European. Both could be expected to assume leadership in their arenas and both seem to be eschewing it. But if you think in terms of classic world politics, global order doesn't produce itself; there has to be somebody who produces it, somebody who takes care of business. The United States already once refused to take care of business in the 1920s—with pretty nasty consequences. And the Germans, if I may put it euphemistically, have taken too much care of business in their past, trying twice to tether Germany and Europe, with more painful outcomes each time.

Is it correct to describe the situation as I just did, or am I off the mark? Vali, why don't you? You wrote the book.

Nasr: The United States is a reluctant hegemon. The American people are reluctant, and the US government has actually been promoting its reluctance as a new foreign policy doctrine. It also prefers to think that it's not unique in being reluctant, but I'm not sure that that necessarily holds. China is beginning to assert hegemonic interest in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, and very soon we're going to see it on the borders of India and Central Asia as well. We can think of the Chinese as gradual expansionist hegemons.

Russia is a very enthusiastic hegemon. Its ambitions may be outsized in relation to its capacity, but it has all the right relationships. It has a strategic understanding with China over Central Asia and over Asia itself. It is developing a relationship with Germany and Europe on the back of oil and gas, particularly on gas, which is much more important than we understand. Russia is very well poised to create hydrocarbon hegemony over Europe. They have the right relationships in the Middle East. They bet on the country that now looks like the rising power there: Iran. They are well positioned, and that is psychologically important to them. The way Russia's hegemonic ambitions play out will actually be decisive in the US-China relationship as well as in the German–US relationship going forward.

Ignatieff: I think there are a few things that ought to be added to that. If you ask who's cleaning up the Philippines, it's the US Pacific fleet. If you ask who just did the six-month deal with Iran, the United States was crucial. If the global economy is being managed at all, it's being managed largely by the United States with the tacit cooperation of the Chinese. You see the United States continuing to provide very important public goods, and I don't see anybody else doing this. I get the feeling that the Chinese are not contributing to global public goods.

Is there a second game going on? Yes. When you go to Europe you get the feeling that there exists a kind of utopia of a world coordinated by international law, conventional agreement, ratification. In The Hague you're in a kind of paradise beyond power. Is it fading? Is it weakening? I don't necessarily think so.

But there are some public goods that are absolutely going begging. The most obvious one is that the planet is heating up, and no one is grabbing that. Here's where we've discovered that the world of convention and agreement and negotiation and multilateralism has failed utterly. It seems to me sovereigns are going to have to start taking sovereign decisions to change their domestic policies and then that will spread. That strikes me as one place where we have neither hegemony nor multilateral agreement.

Schaefer: China will resist more global responsibility unless it has clearly defined national interests at stake. Africa, Iran, Central Asia are

theaters in which China has an obvious interest in energy and resource security. That is and will remain the key driver for Chinese foreign policy in the decades to come. It will also determine its relationship with Russia, which is subject to conflicting interests regarding Central Asia. China is also reluctant to accept a conventional framework that has been built by Western powers. And China is not alone. Other emerging economies are arriving at a point where they say, "Yes, we want to engage in conventional frameworks, but [they] cannot be dictated by the West alone anymore."

Mousavizadeh: There is a danger of false nostalgia for the world that we've left. And it's certainly a false nostalgia if you're at the other end of the Western stick. Now, we can say there has been a creation of global public goods that has benefited everyone, not just the West. But from the perspective of Beijing, the entire postwar structure was created by someone else and largely to sustain Western dominance.

In the future there are going to be many more players around the table. You now have Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, and a whole range of other countries that are economically empowered to assert their political interests in a way they haven't done before. They will question the system that they have inherited and that we would like them to sustain. And I think they will question it for good reasons.

I also think there is a danger in assuming that there is too much to lose in the United States not playing its hegemonic role. There is something to be gained from having regional actors step up. What you're seeing in the Middle East now is actually a much more pragmatic approach to finding accommodation with Iran. It is a healthy thing that the United States is "leaving" the region, certainly relative to its presence in the last forty years. It is an unstable transition, but it's a transition towards a broader equilibrium of power, which I think is more sustainable and more resonant with the politics of these countries.

Nasr: More often than not, people talk about hegemony in neighborhoods and not at a global level. But the United States has prevented countries such as India and Iran from establishing regional hegemony. It's not allowing China to establish hegemony in its own region, and it didn't want to allow the Russians to establish hegemony in their region. So if America is withdrawing, many countries are going to assert themselves.

China is not putting the issue of hegemony on its mastheads going forward, but looking at the way China does economics, it's inevitable that it goes down that road, because its whole approach to global economics is mercantilist. In other words, it's based on dominating the relationship of resources, investment, and trade. The Chinese are not interested in buying oil or buying cotton on global markets; they want to structure a relationship directly with South Sudan. Eventually they will have to protect those relationships.

Aside from the US, the scramble for Africa right now involves Brazil, Turkey, and China, and there might be others coming in. The Turks have decided Somalia belongs to them. They are signing all the oil deals, they're investing; it's the Chinese model. At some point they become committed to protecting that economic relationship. They're trying to establish these nineteenth-century economic relationships, and economic imperialism turns into political imperialism.

Joffe: We've been talking about the kind of games played in this world. Is it the European no-power institutional game, or is it the Russian-Chinese revisionist balance-of-power game? Is America retracting, bowing to the inevitable, or is America still, in a weird way, pulling the strings?

Slaughter: Richard Holbrooke would not be happy with the image of the United States in some kind of long-term decline. He would say, "I believe this is a cycle." This is a cycle of overextension and then retrenchment. But even the retrenchment is a military and not a diplomatic retrenchment. The military use of power looks like hegemony, but it bleeds us in the long term, and so we've pulled back and put diplomacy first. That's messy and it's slow and sometimes it doesn't work at all. But I still don't see any other nation that can occupy the center. Certainly other nations can join us, but the idea that Russia or China is going to play that role diplomatically is just unthinkable.

Joffe: Is perhaps Germany, which has forsaken warfare completely for welfare at home, the avant garde of the West?

Slaughter: No. Look at the United States tying itself in absolute knots because we've taken one small step closer to providing health insurance for a country that has thirty or fourty-odd million people without it. I don't think a European-style welfare state can be attained through reform. I think they got there through a very distinct pattern of cataclysm and rebuilding, and critical rebuilding, in the shadow of American power.

Ignatieff: The idea of a cycle is premised on twentieth-century thinking and American dominance at the end of World War II. I agree that we don't see any sign of American economic decline or military decline. What's happening is we've got a fantastically more pluralist world with a multi-power center that we didn't have in 1945. The twenty-first century will not allow America to go through that cycle again, because the power configuration is so different.

Schaefer: This is a period characterized by a difficult search for identity by most of the potential global players. The only global player still in place is the US. And the US is likely to remain the only world power for a long time. China will not be a great power; India will not be a great power for a long time—reluctant or not. But the rules of the game in the twenty-first century are likely to be different from those in the twentieth century. The power game will not be military-strategic, in the old sense. It will be about licenses, about credits, about economic influence.

Mousavizadeh: The most significant event of 2013 was the revelation of the absolutely unbound US data-surveillance system. What this has revealed, certainly in the eyes of most countries, is not a United States that's about setting rules that respect everyone's privacy and sovereign rights, but which is sweeping every country. And so I think we face a much higher hurdle to convincing the world that we are actually about setting fair rules when nothing would suggest that we are.

Schaefer: The NSA affair has deepened the gap of mistrust between Europe and the United States. But it has not triggered this process; it started during the conflict over Iraq. We were side-by-side going into Afghanistan, but the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq resulted in a split within the EU and between Europe and the US. This trust gap has widened since. We are in serious danger of losing sight of the importance of the transatlantic partnership, and that between the largest European country and the US.

Koh: The fact that the US has extraordinary capabilities doesn't mean that it doesn't believe in rules. It has to both use its hegemonic power to build systems of rules and work with others who believe in law to enforce systems of rules through processes that don't look self-serving. If you don't take up this challenge, people will say, "You're just like China." And I think that's a very dangerous equivalence.

The question then becomes: who enforces existing international law, and who creates new international laws in a world of reluctant hegemons? Obviously China does not want us to create rules on cyber warfare. China does not want us to create rules on global climate change. Germany is promoting a system of restraint but assuming somebody else will enforce these rules. And the United States ends up in a position where they don't enforce these rules either.

So what do we do about the chemical weapons in Syria or the situation we're now facing in the South China Sea, where there are obviously rules of international law that need to be enforced? China's pushing the boundaries there, but we don't have a multilateral process at the moment that's set up to push back against all the different unilateral assertions of power.

Joffe: You say, "enforce." How does one enforce international law?

Koh: Diplomacy is at the front, but as Richard Holbrooke often said, diplomacy has to be backed by other smart-power resources, and one of them is force in the background. That's what brings people to the table and allows you to create a regime like Dayton.

Joffe: Europe, with the occasional exception of Britain and France, has lost its warrior culture; it has lost its interest in expansion and using military action for political gains. The Clausewitzian connection has been broken, and this in a chunk of the world that looks back on an ancient history of imperialism, aggression, expansion, war. Does this development tell us something about how a whole culture can shed a strategic identity?

Ignatieff: Europe actually has an enormous strategic identity and an enormous strategic role, not simply through the sheer size of its market but also through the creation of a political order beyond sovereignty. It's spent fifty, sixty years trying to do that, and it is leading the world in that way. It is, in my view, a grand destiny. You can see the ways in which it's changing identities, changing cultures.

Germany has not, I think, decided whether it will drive the creation of a post-sovereign order in Europe, come hell or high water. If it makes the right decisions, there's an enormous strategic prize for Europe in the twenty-first century. The alternative is to re-sovereigntize Europe because you can't mutualize risk. That's a future that I think Europe ought to refuse. It seems it is ultimately going to be Germany's role to prevent this from happening.

METAPHORS RUN AMOK

Despite his weariness with such categorization, Ben Marcus's reputation as a crafter of experimental prose was secure long before his much-ballyhooed feud with Jonathan Franzen. When Franzen, between writing the bestsellers *The Corrections* and *Freedom*, began to argue in favor of narrative realist, mass-market fiction, Marcus countered with an extensive and oft-quoted 2005 essay on experimental fiction in *Harper's Magazine*. Subsequently editing an anthology of short stories by authors including Jhumpa Lahiri, George Saunders, and Lydia Davis, Marcus highlighted the multifaceted innovations of his generation of writers. In his preface he proclaimed: "A writer has to believe, and prove, that there are, if not new stories, then new ways of telling the old ones."

Ten years earlier, in 1995, Ben Marcus had published *The Age of Wire and String*, a collection of cryptic miniatures that defies attempts to distinguish a plot and characters, shifting the focus almost entirely to the concrete and purely situational. Periodically interposed glossaries lexicalize shifts in the meanings of certain words. What at first appears to be conventional English is soon revealed to be the indecipherable diction of another life form.

Marcus demonstrates in his second book, *Notable American Women*—supposedly the story of his own family—that his literary craft is inevitably tied to the deconstruction of genres, in this case, the memoir. In the work's epistolary preface, the father of the book's fictional Ben Marcus makes a series of statements that draw the narrator's reliability into doubt: "How can a single word from Ben Marcus's rotten, filthy heart be trusted?" The false autobiography describes a cult that aims to achieve a state beyond verbal and gestural communication, and to which the self-sacrificing mother has succumbed.

If the rejection of language bears the promise of happiness in *Notable American Women*, in his 2012 novel, *The Flame Alphabet*, it is a necessary protective measure against an ominous disease. Without warning, the speech of children had become toxic to adults. White noise is used to drown out the poisonous language in the streets. So-called "anti-comprehension pills" can only delay the physical decline of adults. As the pandemic begins to decompose the inorganic environment, the well-intentioned quarantine of children turns into a macabre internment of adolescent disease carriers. The dark fable marks in many respects a development toward greater narrative stringency. For the first time, Marcus transcends his fear of the dialogic and provides, all scurrility aside, sensitive insight into a torn family.

With the exception of two fictitious interviews, Marcus's latest work, *Leaving the Sea* (2013), can be safely categorized as a collection of short stories. Its title alludes to "the evolutionary mistake made by prehistoric species of leaving the primordial waters." The longing for a thoughtless, harmonious aquatic existence can be understood after reading the volume's 15 stories: The evacuation of a small town would not be simulated so often until the difference between simulation and real disaster was rendered moot. A man suffering from a self-diagnosed, possibly imaginary illness would not be subjected to a questionable treatment. And a disgruntled lecturer would likely not give a course in creative writing on a cruise ship.

In the cruise-ship seminar, it is noted of an ambitious pupil: "His metaphor was out of hand, running amok." The fact that this may also apply to Marcus, who, incidentally, teaches creative writing at Columbia University, is most clearly illustrated by the title story. In a single sentence, metaphors cascade across nearly ten pages, until the breathless narrator is finally worn down by the "noise" of his own breathing. Though Marcus's horrific passages are brilliantly crafted, one could—blunted by their graphic suffering—long for more subtle ellipses if it were not in these passages that his subtly ambivalent humor most clearly invites identification with the plight of humanity.

By Jan Bender
From the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 22, 2014

BOOK REVIEWS



THE WAY HOPE BUILDS HIS HOUSE
BY SUSAN STEWART

A review of
The Gorgeous Nothings

Edited by Marta Werner
and Jen Bervin
Preface by Susan Howe
New Directions/
Christine Burgin,
in association
with Granary Books
October 2013
255 pages

Perhaps the most lasting legacy of the late eighteenth-century Jena circle of German Romantics and their short-lived journal, *Athenaeum*, has been the high regard they brought to the fragment. Conceiving of the literary or artistic fragment as a "partial whole," August and Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich von Schelling, and other philosophers and artists of their circle sought a way to live both with and without a system, to find a unifying means of artistic production that remained open to what we might call the potential of the part. If fragments such as inscriptions from ruined monuments or the folk proverbs of oral tradition seemed to promise an aphoristic sense of completion, the Jena Romantic fragment, in contrast, framed an opening to infinity. These writers and thinkers envisioned the very incompletion of the fragment, its unfinished, nascent, quality, as the source of its power. Today their aesthetic of the fragment haunts the displays of our archaeological museums, our reverence for the "unfinished" sculptures of Donatello and Michelangelo, our taste for sketches, and the twentieth-century century invention of "found" and "process" art.

Like most nineteenth-century North American intellectuals, the great poet Emily Dickinson absorbed the ideas of the German Romantics through the translations of Thomas Carlyle and via the German influence upon the American Transcendentalists and the English Romantics, particularly Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Percy Shelley, and, of special importance for Dickinson, Emily Brontë. One German Romantic who had a direct influence upon her, and whose words she sometimes incorporated into her poems, was one of her favorite novelists: Jean Paul [Richter]. Jean Paul, at the margins of the Jena group, took a stance against what he thought to be their nihilism.

If not a proponent of *Weltschmerz* herself, Dickinson nevertheless pursued in the form and content of her work a way of writing that was deeply alienated from the sentimental truisms and thumping narrative verse forms of her time. Her fundamental choice to write in the meter and stanzas of congregational hymns—the English "common meter"—a poetry of radically individual, and deeply critical, perceptions makes her an excellent practitioner of the Jena unsystematic system. In her personal library she kept volumes of the adages of Martin Tupper and the hymns of Isaac Watts. But there is a world of difference between Tupper's "A good book is the best of friends, the same today and forever," or Watts's "How doth the little busy bee improve each shining hour" and Dickinson's poems based upon such thoughts as:

Publication—is the Auction
Of the Mind of Man—
Poverty—be justifying
For so foul a thing

or the insight beginning one of her most powerful elegiac verses:

After great pain a formal
feeling comes—
The nerves sit ceremonious
like tombs;

The relevance of the aesthetic of the fragment and the unsystematic system to Emily Dickinson's work is most evident, however, in the longstanding controversies regarding the reception of her poetry. During her lifetime, only a few of her poems appeared in print, and she never had an opportunity to edit their final appearance. When she died, in 1886, her sister, Lavinia, fulfilled a promise she had made to Emily to burn a large set of her letters, but Dickinson left behind hundreds of poems in manuscript, hundreds more woven into her letters to her many correspondents, and eight hundred poems gathered into forty hand-sewn small pamphlets, or "fascicles." Her sister-in-law, Susan Gilbert Dickinson, to whom she had sent poems and letters on a near-daily basis, held a trove of her work. Lavinia possessed yet another vast cache—drafts and fair copies of poems on sheets of writing paper in multiple versions, and many other drafts written on scraps of envelopes, old letters, margins of newsprint, and pieces of brown wrapping paper. In a falling out with Susan, Lavinia turned to her Amherst neighbor Mabel Loomis Todd and to Dickinson's friend and correspondent, the prominent editor and journalist Thomas Wentworth Higginson, for help in editing and publishing her sister's work. Todd was the wife of an Amherst astronomy professor and the mistress of Susan's husband, Austin Dickinson—Lavinia and Emily's brother.

The archive of Emily Dickinson's poetry was thereby split and incomplete from the start. In the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, more than a dozen editions of her work appeared under the editorial hands of Todd, Higginson, and others. Editors invariably made their selections and "corrections" in conformity with contemporary taste, taking the work far from its appearance in manuscript form and turning its unconventional visual arrangements into conventional printed wholes. Questions of Dickinson's intention became impossible to address: Which were the final versions of her work? How did she envision the relations between poems and between fascicles? Were her unique means of inscribing and punctuating her work with dashes, dots, and other marks, and her inclusion of variants on the same page with what seemed to be finished works, a matter of haste and or a concerted turn toward a *Gesamtwerk*?

Susan Dickinson's manuscripts were sold to Harvard University in 1950, and Harvard has closely guarded their publication by its own press ever since, first in Thomas Johnson's 1955 *Complete Poems*, which included 1,775 works and their variants, and then in Ralph Franklin's 1998 monumental variorum edition of 1,789 poems, based on careful study of the fascicles and extant manuscripts. The remaining works, the manuscripts held by Mabel Todd and her descendants, were donated to Amherst College in 1956. This year, after some continuing battles between the two archives, Amherst and Harvard finally have agreed to put all of the extant manuscripts on-line with free access to anyone who wants to study them, at *edickinson.org*.

We will never have the poems that lived in Dickinson's burned letters and we will never know the exact order or dates of her work; we can only guess how many of her poems have been lost or destroyed. Yet her reputation has only grown since the 1950s, and Dickinson scholarship has continued to flower in recent decades, furthered by the pioneering textual and material studies of the manuscripts by the poet Susan Howe and the scholars Marta Werner, Sharon Cameron, Cristanne Miller, and others.

Now, collaborating with the artist Jen Bervin in what was at first a limited edition artists' book with Granary Books in New York, Werner has produced a handsome full-color facsimile edition of all the known Dickinson manuscripts written on envelopes and parts of envelopes. Drawn almost entirely from the Amherst archive, with only one example from Harvard, *The Gorgeous Nothings* gives a vivid sense of these 52 works. The book provides a page for each envelope poem, accompanied by a facing page transcription of Dickinson's famously hard-to-read handwriting. A preface by Howe and thoughtful essays by both Bervin and Werner provide further context. The book concludes with a set of indices that group the fragments in alternative ways: by page shape, addressee, the presence of erasures and cancellations, the direction of the writing, and other textual features.

The result is a book of surprises and pleasures, both visual and verbal, on every page. Readers can gain a new sense of the topography of Dickinson's work. We see how she thinks through themes of motion, conceiving the envelopes' parts as wings and arrows, as she also confronts or ignores the limits of folds, lines, seams, and edges. She sometimes pins fragments together in an effort somewhere between frugal nineteenth-century American "salvage crafts," such as quilt- and rug-making, and the by-now-longstanding avant-garde practice of newspaper and paper assemblages.

Are these quick drafts for "fuller" works, which may or may not have been completed? Or are they artworks in themselves? Howe, Werner, and Bervin would argue the latter. Indeed, a number of the pieces only can be read, pin-wheel fashion, by turning the paper. In "A 821," a work closely tied to passages in one of Dickinson's extant letters, this becomes a theme: "Clogged/ only with/ Music, like/ the Wheels of/ Birds." Later in the collection an open flap gives an envelope a house-shape, and we find a work beginning "The way/ Hope builds his/ House." (A 450).

Perhaps Dickinson saw the envelope as a canvas for poems immediately, perhaps gradually. This beautiful book, appearing at the same time as the new comprehensive website of her manuscripts, may be the first of many full-color facsimile editions of Dickinson's manuscripts. Important insights into her work are sure to follow. What we already know is that she was a genius of the fragment in every aspect of her practice. It is only now that her letters are truly approaching their destination. □

ON COMMON GROUND
BY ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

A review of *The Limits of Partnership: US–Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century*

By Angela Stent
Princeton University Press
January 2014
384 pages

The political crisis in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of the United States and the European Union's engagement with Russia for facilitating a power transition and stabilization of the Ukrainian economy. It has also revealed a number of serious problems that the Western nations and Russia must resolve if they are to establish trust and a lasting partnership. Immediately following the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014, the two sides pursued mutually exclusive interpretations of the event. Russia defined the revolution as an "anti-constitutional coup" and withdrew its support for Kiev, while the West endorsed the new government as legitimate and provided it with political and economic assistance.

This new book by Angela Stent, which documents US relations with Russia after the end of the Cold War, could not be timelier. Relations remain tense and difficult to understand. Since 1989, the two nations have made several attempts to put their relations on stable footing, each time discovering major differences in perceptions, worldviews, and interests. The two countries contribute greatly to shaping the world from Europe to Eurasia and the Middle East. Yet, despite these two nations' significance, there are few studies available that systematically assess the nature and dynamics of their relationships. Stent's book seeks to fill this gap. It is based on interviews with American and Russian officials and experts and the author's long experience of closely observing the two countries' relations, including as a policymaker and as a participant in expert forums. The book's strengths include clarity of presentation, attention to important details, knowledge of specific relevant contexts, and logical organization of material.

Stent identifies several cycles in US–Russia relations, from George H.W. Bush's attempt to strengthen ties with Russian leadership to Bill Clinton's engagement with Boris Yeltsin, from to George W. Bush's relations with Vladimir Putin to, finally, Barak Obama's ties with Dmitri Medvedev. Each time expectations were high on both sides and each time the relationships soured and ended at a low point. According to Stent, these cycles of rise and decline can be traced to differing worldviews, unrealistic expectations, and wrong perceptions of each other's intentions. While Moscow wanted to build a strategic partnership with the United States on principles of sovereignty and equality, Washington aimed at having Russia as a junior partner supportive of America's global values and interests. The Kremlin insisted on the legitimacy of its interests and principles even from a position of weakness, but the White House failed to acknowledge those interests and principles to the extent that Russia expected. Each time, Stent argues, the US either didn't understand Russia's claims to equality and respect or found those claims to be unreasonable.

On the recommendations side, Stent cautions against unrealistic expectations and advocates that the US build a selective or limited partnership with Russia. She recognizes the importance of the countries' relations and acknowledges that Russia will remain essential for addressing vital issues, including nuclear proliferation and arms control, regional stability in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. But she finds it impossible to move beyond the limited partnership given the two countries' differences in political systems, perceptions, and worldviews.

Overall, the book's narrative is solid and balanced. The theory that varying worldviews and expectations are shaped by the countries' histories and political systems also has some predictive power, even though it remains undeveloped. In particular, the theory implies that, while the two nations' interests are compatible, they are interpreted through a conflictual, rather than a cooperative, lens. These interests include, among others, counterterrorism, nuclear arms control, counter-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and regional security in Europe and the Middle East. Today, one might add, these interests also include a stable Ukraine.

Alas, the United States and Russia expect more than the other side can deliver. While Russia desires extensive cooperation with the West on the basis of respect for its interests and values, Western nations have their own global interests and are frequently uncomfortable with Russia's strong-state system. As a result, the agenda of Russian–West relations tends to be narrower than desired by either side. In addition, the institutional framework for working together is typically weak, and each time, presidential commitment is required for moving the relationship forward. Now that Russia is moving in the direction of further consolidating its strong-state system and is openly proclaiming that its values diverge from those of the West, one can expect further worsening of the US–Russia relations.

Stent did not, of course, have the opportunity to explore these points with respect to the Ukraine crisis, but she has written elsewhere that she expected such worsening to continue, and that yet another reset would not take place. "Unless and until both countries move beyond the legacies of the Cold War, the 1990s, and today's crisis," Stent wrote, on March 27, 2014, in the *Azerbaijan News*, "any reset, regardless of whether it originates in the White House or the Kremlin, can at best manage more effectively what will remain a limited and trying relationship." If the United States and Russia are to make progress, in other words, their forward agenda must be set in narrow and limited terms in order to be realistic.

Though her pessimism is understandable, there are factors that, in the longer run, will push against further worsening of relations—and should be considered by future scholars of this topic. These factors include the relative decline of US global power and influence, preservation of the EU–Russia economic and energy interdependence, rising status of non-Western powers, and the objective needs of the United States and Russia in each other's cooperation.

The biggest limitation of *The Limits of Partnership* is that it is based on analyzing mainstream political perceptions and discourses in Washington and Moscow. Beyond occasional references to realists and critics of *Realpolitik*, there is no systematic analysis of different schools and approaches to the two countries' relations. The Russian side is especially poorly documented, and there are few works by Russian academics cited, although experts, particularly those associated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, are consulted.

This oversight is regrettable because, outside mainstream discourses in the two nations' political capitals, the spectrum of attitudes is much broader, and it extends beyond realists and value-based critics of each other's systems. In addition to critics who proceed from the assumption of incompatible values and interests or who advocate muscular, hegemonic action rather than engagement or partnership, there are those who argue for developing a strong partnership between the two nations that will need each other in an increasingly unstable world—scholars such as Robert Legvold at Columbia University, Anatol Lieven at King's College London, or Sergei Karaganov at the Higher School of Economics. These people are currently in the minority, but with growing effects of the above factors, they may develop a platform from which to influence formation and outcomes in these countries' relations.

So, contrary to understandably pessimistic mainstream thought on true partnership, and in contrast to some of the recommendations *The Limits of Partnership* makes, a successful reset must be based on a broadened agenda, not a limited one. It should incorporate issues related to the development of the Far East, Eurasia, and the arctic, as well as the increasingly vital security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. By expanding the purview and geography of this dialogue, common ground might just be found. □

SEEING REDS

BY JULES FEIFFER, AS TOLD TO THE BERLIN JOURNAL

A review of
Dissident Gardens

By Jonathan Lethem
Doubleday
September 2013
384 pages

Berlin Journal: Did you know Jonathan Lethem before coming to Berlin?

Jules Feiffer: We had never met, but he wrote a lovely quote for the jacket of my memoir, *Backing into Forward*, back when it was published in 2010, and I thought it was quite wonderful. I was already an admirer of his writing. Then I saw the *New York Times* review of *Dissident Gardens*, which sounded like my own background so I immediately went out and bought it. I started reading and felt an immediate affinity for the work. Not just because it described a time and a place that I had lived through, but because the name of one of the characters, Rose, was the name of a character in my play about a communist family that was performed in 2003 —I guess I wrote it in 2001 or 2002 —called *A Bad Friend*. In my play, Rose was the daughter of a communist family, and in Lethem's book, Rose is the mother. He has another character named Miriam, called Mimi, which is the name of my sister, who was the real communist in my family and who I had talked about and written about in interviews. So I thought, "Could this be a coincidence?"

Berlin Journal: But it wasn't a coincidence, was it? He had been inspired by your work. Have you spoken with him about that?

From Jules Feiffer's *Kill My Mother* (W. W. Norton/Liveright), August 2014.

Jules Feiffer: When I arrived at the Academy, in early April, Gary Smith and Ron Suny said that Jonathan had told them he had seen my play and it gave him the idea for doing the book. And when we finally met, during my first week here, we talked about it, and it felt great. To help launch, in whatever small way, something this ambitious, with language this remarkable, was extraordinarily flattering and pleasing.

Because my relationship with my communist sister was the key relationship of my youth, to have Jonathan write a very different version of this in which these core characteristics remain the same, yet with a very different kind of family, was fascinating and transportive. So much of it struck similar chords. I ate it up. I just devoured the whole book.

I had read books like this before, books that dealt with "Reds,"

as they were called, and more often than not, they felt unconvincing to me. But this book was absolutely convincing, and written by a young man who could not in any way have experienced any of this, or even known a lot of it, unless he had grandparents in the Party, which he didn't. It was all homework! I found that simply amazing: that he could pull this off, and make it feel authentic, without any hands-on experience.

Berlin Journal: *A Bad Friend* and *Dissident Gardens* both address problematic interrelationships between ideology and family. What is it about this topic that resonates with you?

Jules Feiffer: In *Dissident Gardens*, Rose dominates her daughter, Mimi. But my parents were not communists, so my sister didn't get it from them. I wasn't dominated by the ideological pressures—other than having this very dominating sister, this explosive, voluble, bad-tempered, at times terrifying creature. At the same time she was very charming and supportive of me and of my work, of my ambitions to be a cartoonist.

When I grew up and she was in high school—she was four years my senior—she brought her friends around who were high-school Reds, who were very entertaining and interesting—and interested in comics! They looked at my comic books, and Mimi got pissed off at me because they were more involved with me than they were with her. But they were funny and they were bright and they were witty and they had iconoclastic styles. I think a lot of the role models I was looking to grow into were these Jewish, commie wise-guys and girls that she always brought home. After all, I had found very few other role models in the Bronx, neither in my family nor among the people around me in the neighborhood. But these guys had a sort of swashbuckling, happy-go-lucky-but-serious-about-the-issues quality about them that I found immensely appealing.

Berlin Journal: Jonathan entitled the first part of his book "Boroughphobia," which could probably describe both the fear of crossing the boundaries of and the fear of entrapment within the boroughs. Is the New York that Jonathan describes the New York that you know?

Jules Feiffer: Jonathan comes from Brooklyn and clearly has a love of Brooklyn, as so many people from Brooklyn do. I came from the Bronx during the 1930s, during the Great Depression, which is a long time before Jonathan came along. And I despised every second of it. I have no nostalgia for that period. For as long as I can remember being conscious, I remember thinking, "I have to break out of this jail." I wanted out. I wanted to go to Manhattan, which I knew only from the movies. It seemed a million miles away, even though it was only a half-hour subway ride—but who knew how to ride the subway? But I found Manhattan—again from the movies—exotic, glamorous, fit for someone with my ambitions, not one of which had been acted upon yet. I wanted to be anywhere in the city but the Bronx. And Brooklyn, I had only been there once or twice in my life until I was insane enough to date girls who lived in Brooklyn. Then I would take these endless subway rides, and I would leave Brooklyn at night as fast as possible so I wouldn't get mugged.

Berlin Journal: Where would you like to see Jonathan Lethem go next?

Jules Feiffer: What impressed me as much about the content of *Dissident Gardens* was the writing style. It is very different from some of his earlier work. Even within the book he changes styles. I find that rather stunning. You know, these adventures in style. I have no idea where that will go, but I'm looking forward to it. His going from realism to something beyond that, which I cannot label.

Perhaps this stylistic malleability comes from his being of a very different generation. He was in on the change in the culture from the beginning, the change in music from the beginning, and, of course, these things are always happening. Just as a young writer today, twenty years Jonathan's junior, is comming out of another world with a different language and a different take on all these things. Just as I came out of the Depression and the Cold War 1950s. I was a witness to everything being shaken up. Everything was undergoing change, and nobody realized it until it was almost over, but the entire first half of the twentieth century was being overturned—new theater, new art, Abstract Expressionism—into new writing and new attitudes. This, while McCarthyism was going on, and black lists, and sympathy oaths—all going on at the same time. This war that the culture had with itself exploded in the 1960s. But the whole young generation of the 1960s never knew about the repression, never knew there was a time when you couldn't go around expressing your ideas. It was an extraordinary shift in the culture, and the book is able to capture its layered, comical, and strange complexity. □

ALUMNI BOOKS

Daniel Albright
Panaesthetics: On the Unity and Diversity of the Arts
Yale UP, March 2014

Karen Alter
The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights
Princeton UP, January 2014

Sinan Antoon
The Poetics of the Obscene in Premodern Arabic Poetry: Ibn al-Hajjaj and Sukhf
Palgrave Macmillan, February 2014

Barry Bergdoll
Schinkel, Persius, Stüler: Buildings in Berlin and Potsdam
Edition Axel Menges, February 2014

Philip V. Bohlman (Ed.)
The Cambridge History of World Music
Cambridge UP, January 2014

David Bollier
Think Like a Commoner: A Short Introduction to the Life of the Commons
New Society Publishers, March 2014

Svetlana Boym/Hans Ulrich Obrist/Philip Monk
Raqs Media Collective: Casebook
Art Gallery of York University, March 2014

Lothar Baumgarten/ Benjamin Buchloh/ Gunda Luyken
Candida Höfer: Düsseldorf
Richter/Fey Verlag, March 2014

Joy H. Calico
Arnold Schoenberg's A Survivor from Warsaw in Postwar Europe
University of California Press, March 2014

Hal Foster
Barkow Leibinger
Hatje Cantz, May 2014

Rivka Galchen
American Innovations
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, May 2014

Richard Hawkins
Fragile Flowers
Les Presses Du Reel, February 2014

Esperanza Rosales/ Samantha Topol
Leslie Hewitt: Sudden Glare of the Sun
Contemporary Art Museum St. Louis, February 2014

John B. Judis
Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, February 2014

Ward Just
American Romantic
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, April 2014

Wendy Lesser
Why I Read: The Serious Pleasure of Books
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, January 2014

Lawrence Lessig
The USA is Lesterland: The Nature of Congressional Corruption
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, February 2014

Evonne Levy/Kenneth Mills (Eds.)
Lexicon of the Hispanic Baroque: Transatlantic Exchange and Transformation
University of Texas Press, January 2014

Ben Marcus
Leaving the Sea
Knopf, January 2014

Charles Marsh
Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Knopf, April 2014

Elizabeth McCracken
Thunderstruck & Other Stories
The Dial Press, April 2014

Christopher Middleton
Collected Later Poems
Carcanet Press Ltd, January 2014

Tal Ben-Zvi/Kamal Boullata/ W.J.T. Mitchell
Asim Abu Shaqura
Charta, February 2014

Lance Olsen
[[there.]]
Anti-Oedipus Press, January 2014

Theories of Forgetting
Fiction Collective 2, February 2014

Philip Phan/Jull Kickul/ Sophie Bacq/Matthias Nordqvist (Eds.)
Theory and Empirical Research in Social Entrepreneurship
Edward Elgar Publishing, April 2014

W. S. Di Piero
Tombo
McSweeney's, January 2014

Karen Russell
Sleep Donation
Atavist Books, March 2014 (digital-only novella)

Gary Shteyngart
Little Failure: A Memoir
Random House, January 2014

Angela Stent
The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century
Princeton UP, January 2014

Camilo José Vergara
Harlem: The Unmaking of a Ghetto
University of Chicago Press, December 2013

PROFILES IN SCHOLARSHIP

The American Academy is proud to present the spring 2014 class of fellows and distinguished visitors.

The American civil rights movement was profoundly shaped by William Stewart Nelson. Siemens Fellow **Dennis C. Dickerson** describes how Nelson, dean of the School of Religion at Howard University during the 1940s, promoted a doctrine of nonviolence and peace drawn from his association with Quakers, interactions with Mahatma Gandhi, and encounters with the sacred texts of "the great living religions." Dickerson is the James M. Lawson, Jr. Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.

On the eve of 9/11, Daimler Fellow **Leslie Dunton-Downer** encountered the singing voice of a young Muslim man, Aqnazar, in the mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan. Her Academy project recounts the repercussions of the meeting: she learns classical Persian and Tajik, writes and directs a play for Aqnazar and others to perform in Paris, co-produces a documentary film, and accompanies him on tour through the United States.

Visual media artist and Guna S. Mundheim Fellow **LaToya Ruby Frazier** has always moved freely among photography, performance, and video. In her Academy project, "Framework: Activism, Memory and the Social Landscape," she continues to explore the power of photographic images to capture and explain social change, most prominently in her hometown of Braddock, Pennsylvania.

Composer, improviser, and sound artist **Matthew Goodheart** has developed a wide body of work that explores the relationships between performer, instrument, and listener. His diverse musical creations range from large-scale microtonal compositions to open improvisations and immersive sound installations. During his time at the Academy, Goodheart will compose *For Five Scattered Ensembles*, a work that combines strict notation, structured improvisation, and real-time algorithmic composition.

Ellen Maria Gorrissen Fellow **Linda Henderson's** Academy project, "The Energies of Modernism," is the first major study of the science and occultism that were central to modern artists' understanding of reality and to the new languages they invented to embody it. Her project looks to two central concepts animating the popular mind of the time: the "ether" and the spatial fourth dimension. Henderson is the David Bruton, Jr. Centennial Professor in Art History and Distinguished Teaching Professor at the University of Texas at Austin.

Mary Ellen von der Heyden Fellow in Fiction **Jonathan Lethem** is the author of nine novels, including, most recently, *Dissident Gardens* (2013) and *Chronic City* (2009). During his stay at the Academy he is outlining a series of intersecting novels and novellas. Lethem is the Roy Edward Disney Professor of Creative Writing at Pomona College.

The public transformation of Elvis Presley from the rock-and-roll rebel of *Jailhouse Rock* to the clean-living all-American of *G.I. Blues* is indicative of the impact of Army socialization on American youth. Bosch Fellow **Brian McAllister Linn,** the Ralph R. Thomas Professor in Liberal Arts and Professor of History at Texas A&M University, examines how the 1950s US Army became the "school of the nation," teaching American males not only military skills, but social religion, patriotism, and anti-communism.

Photographer and Dirk Ippen Fellow **Dominique Nabokov** divides her time between the United States and France, where she was raised and began her career in fashion photography. She returns to the Academy to work on her book project *Berlin Living Rooms*, the third in her trilogy of interiors, after *New York Living Rooms* and *Paris Living Rooms*.

In her Academy project, "Endgame: Soviet Collaborators, Spies, and Agents of Influence at the End of WWII," Holtzbrink Fellow **Sylvia Nasar,** the John S. and James L. Knight Professor of Journalism at Columbia University, tells the story of some privileged, highly educated men and women—economists, mathematicians, scientists—who were singled out for success in their own countries but chose to collaborate with the other side.

Richard Holbrooke's life and work encompassed many of the crises, triumphs, and tragedies of American foreign policy over the past two generations. Axel Springer Fellow **George Packer's** new book project, *Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century,* traces the storied diplomat's career from Vietnam in the early 1960s through the Balkans in the mid-1990s—and to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Holbrooke's last diplomatic mission. Packer is a staff writer at the *New Yorker*.

In 1999, the University of Michigan's Abydos Middle Cemetery Project, directed by **Janet Richards**, rediscovered the lost tomb of Weni the Elder, a court official of the Sixth Dynasty of ancient Egypt. The Abydos excavations provide the point of departure for her current project as Ellen Maria Gorrissen Fellow of History. "Writing Ancient Lives: Weni the Elder and Ancient Egyptian Responses to Political Crisis" uses textual and spatial biographies to explore how ancient Egyptians crafted and manipulated narratives of individual and political identity. Richards is professor of Egyptology at the University of Michigan's department of Near Eastern studies and curator for dynastic Egypt at its Kelsey Museum of Archaeology.

Independent journalist and Axel Springer Fellow **Laura Secor** has spent nearly a decade researching and writing about Iran. This spring, she will complete her book *Fugitives from Paradise,* which chronicles the emergence of the movement for democratic reform within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Poet, critic, and John P. Birkelund Fellow **Susan Stewart** is writing *The Ruins Lesson,* a work on the representation and function of ruins in Western art and literature. Stewart is also resolving the structure for her new collection of poems, *Bramble*, which she describes as "a book concerned with history and the imagination by using the dual concepts of

thickets and clearings, juxtaposing dense and musical passages." Stewart is the Avalon Foundation University Professor of the Humanities, professor of English, and director of the Society of Fellows in the Liberal Arts at Princeton University.

Instead of looking at the deportations and massacres of Armenians and Assyrians in Eastern Anatolia in 1915 as the outcome of nationalist or religious conflict, Anna-Maria Kellen Fellow **Ronald Suny** argues that state authorities acted to realize a number of strategic goals. He employs the concept "affective disposition" to explain an environment in which the Armenians were seen as an existential threat to the Empire and the Turkish people. Suny is Charles Tilly Collegiate Professor of Social and Political History at the University of Michigan.

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For complete biographies of the spring 2014 fellows and distinguished visitors, please visit our website, *americanacademy.de*.

WELCOMING NEW TRUSTEES

Christine I. Wallich is a senior advisor at the World Bank's Center on Conflict, Security, and Development, in Nairobi, Kenya. She joined the World Bank in 1977 and has served as lead economist for Europe and Central Asia, country director for Bosnia Herzegovina—where she represented the World Bank at the Dayton Peace negotiations—and country director for Bangladesh and the South Asia Regional Office. She has written on post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia, reform in transition economies, economic prospects in Asia, and corporate governance. Wallich and her family have strong ties to Germany: her grandfather Paul Wallich was one of the founding directors of Deutsche Bank.

Adam Posen is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. He is an expert on macroeconomic policy, resolution of financial crises, central banking policy, and the economies of Europe, Japan, and the United States. Posen wrote the definitive book on Japan's 1990s economic crisis, *Restoring Japan's Economic Growth* (1998), counseled the Koizumi government that led Japan's recovery, and served as a member of the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England. He also has co-authored, with Ben Bernanke, a reform program for Fed policy, and he currently advises the US Congressional Budget Office. Posen was a Bosch Public Policy Fellow at the Academy in spring 2001.

Wolfgang A. Herrmann has been president of the Technische Universität München since 1995 and is one of Germany's leading chemists. Following professorships in Frankfurt am Main and Regensburg, he joined the Technische Universität München in 1985. A member of numerous academic societies and committees, Herrmann has served as the chairman of the supervisory board of the Deutsches Museum in Munich since 1998. He holds honorary doctorates from 11 universities and is one of the most highly cited German chemists, with roughly 740 scientific publications and eighty patents.

Roger Cohen is a columnist and foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*. He began his career as the newspaper's European economic correspondent in Paris before covering the Bosnian War as Balkan bureau chief. He also served as the bureau chief in Berlin from 1998 to 2001, after which he became foreign editor of the *New York Times*' head office. Cohen was awarded the Joe Alex Morris Lectureship for distinguished foreign correspondence by the Nieman Foundation for Journalism at Harvard University and has served as Ferris Professor of Journalism at Princeton University. He was a Bosch Public Policy Fellow at the Academy in spring 2006.

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