



HENRY A. KISSINGER PRIZE

HONORING
AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER

Wednesday, June 8, 2016



THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY IN BERLIN
HANS ARNHOLD CENTER

HENRY A. KISSINGER PRIZE

HONORING AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

Welcoming Remarks

GERHARD CASPER

3

Introductory Remarks

HENRY A. KISSINGER

4

Laudation

CHRISTOPH HEUSGEN

6

Citation for Ambassador Samantha Power

GAHL HODGES BURT

10

Remarks by

SAMANTHA POWER

11



THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY IN BERLIN
HANS ARNHOLD CENTER

WELCOMING REMARKS BY

GERHARD CASPER

President of the American Academy in Berlin

Secretary Kissinger,
Ambassador Power,
Dr. Heusgen,
President-elect Steinberg,
Ministers,
Excellencies,
Members of Parliament,
Friends and Supporters of the
American Academy in Berlin,
Ladies and Gentlemen,



The year at the American Academy is marked by three highlights: the presentation of the fall semester fellows, the presentation of the next semester's fellows and the award of the Henry Kissinger Prize. There can be a fourth, fifth, sixth highlight, if a fellow or one of our distinguished visitors delivers an especially sparkling lecture, which happens actually quite frequently.

IN HER RECENT BOOK on the founder of the American Academy, Richard Holbrooke, which is titled *The Unquiet American*, Samantha Power said about Richard: "Holbrooke placed a premium on 'knowing something about something.' He prized knowledge that came from experience in the field, but equally that from books and articles." That is a pretty good description of what the American Academy in Berlin is about, and I welcome all of you, but especially Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Power, to this highlight of our year. And within that highlight, Henry, your annual visit is itself a highlight.

Richard Holbrooke, when serving as the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, from 1999 until 2001, did yeoman's work to persuade Congress that the United States needed to pay the

roughly \$1 billion in dues that it then owed. He began this effort with a dinner for a Republican senator at the Waldorf Astoria, which at least two people present tonight attended: Kati Marton and Henry Kissinger. One staff member of the US mission to the UN alleged that no cabinet member in any administration since the dawn of time visited as many congressmen as Richard Holbrooke.

The point that Holbrooke made over and over again to members of Congress and to the general public was that the United States needed the United Nations in order to engage the world:

American leaders of both parties have called the UN vital to our national security ... The reason is simple: for all its faults, its inefficiencies, and its shortcomings, if the UN did not exist, we would have to invent it ... We therefore need the UN as a place where nations with common interests can come together; a place, in the words of the UN Charter, to 'harmonize the actions of nations towards common ends.'

Of course, Holbrooke also quotes from a speech that Adlai Stevenson gave in Chicago in 1945: the Charter "is only paper—no better and no worse than the will and intentions of its five major members."

If the term “major member” is not defined by reference to a permanent seat on the Security Council with veto power, Germany has certainly become a major member as measured by the level of its political, financial, and now even military engagement with the United Nations.

In the past, at these occasions, other aspects of the transatlantic relationship have been in the foreground. The American Academy’s decision to award the Kissinger Prize to Samantha Power, as a significant scholar and as a practitioner of United States foreign

policy in the United Nations, is an indication of the importance the United Nations have for the transatlantic relationship.

In a recent book, Samantha Power made reference to the “plagues” that preoccupy us today: “civil war, refugee flows, religious extremism, suppressed national and religious identity, genocide and terrorism.” Seeing these plagues as challenges, we are very fortunate to have people like Samantha Power, Christoph Heusgen, and, of course, Henry Kissinger think about them.

I give you Secretary Kissinger.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY HENRY A. KISSINGER US Secretary of State, 1973 – 1977

Gerhard and Friends,

t has become customary that I say a few words in German before I go into my comments—and for two reasons: first, to show my connection to the country in which I was born; second, to give Gerhard and others here an opportunity to contrast the pronunciation of Fürth with the pronunciation of northern Germany. Samantha, to people of Berlin, my accent sounds like that of Mississippi to you. So, if you permit me, I’ll say a few words in German:

Vor zwei Jahrzehnten hat mich Richard Holbrooke zu einem Frühstück eingeladen. Wenn man Richard Holbrooke kannte, ist das Wort „befohlen“ besser als „eingeladen“. Er hatte eine neue Idee. Eine neue Idee war nicht selten von Richard. Und aus diesem Grund hat er mich und unseren Freund Richard von Weizsäcker zu diesem Frühstück eingeladen.

Samantha, what I just said was that, two decades ago, Richard Holbrooke invited me and Richard von



Weizsäcker to a breakfast. I pointed out that “invited” is not the precise word I should have used, that it was more “commanded” to come to this breakfast. And he had a new idea. And as most and nearly all of his ideas, it was an important vision.

For the whole period since the Second World War, Berlin had become a symbol of the defense of freedom, of the maintenance of the relations between America and Europe, and particularly with Germany. It was symbolized by the Airlift, the varied episodes of Berlin Blockades, the building of the Wall, and the collapse of the Wall. Richard Holbrooke proposed that now that the four-

power administration of Berlin was ending as a result of unification and the joint efforts of Germany and the United States and other allies, that a new symbol of Atlantic ties be created. It should not be a military one, but one that emphasized the cultural, intellectual, and moral relationships between our continents. He invited Richard von Weizsäcker and me to act as honorary co-chairmen.

Many here will remember Dick as an extraordinary diplomat. But those of us who interacted with him recognized that he was a natural force—and that to resist him was more painful than to acquiesce to his ideas.

The Academy was a great idea, and it took no great effort for us to be convinced. Moreover, we knew that most of the hard work would be done by Richard Holbrooke. And though we had extraordinary titles, it was his commitment and his dedication that made this institution what it is today.

Richard von Weizsäcker pointed out that, given my interest in soccer, we should establish the relative rank between ourselves by the relative position of Hertha and Fürth. That was a very diplomatic proposal at the time, because it was the only time in a decade—or forever, as far as I know—that Fürth had a better position than Hertha, which had been relegated to the Second Division at that point. But it also guaranteed that would not be repeated very often.

At any rate, this is how the structure of the Academy was established. With Richard Holbrooke providing the inspiration, and with the goodwill and occasional assistance of many others.

At that time, there was no building. There was no program. It was a case where a vision created the reality. And so to all the people here who made their house available—the Arnhold family—and the many others who have contributed their efforts and material support, we can be very proud that on this twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the Academy, and the tenth anniversary of the Kissinger Prize, we have achieved a vibrant institution.

Unfortunately, the founders are facing implacable actuarial tables. Some have, too painfully, left us. The two most recent were Fritz Stern and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Fritz Stern was a product of the generation who left Germany under difficult circumstances but still felt so connected with the country of their birth that, even after their departure, they always felt a

special obligation and a special impulse to work together again with the Germany in which they had been brought up, before the dictatorship. It was eased by the extraordinary effort that Germany made—and succeeded in—in becoming a democratic country, dedicated to the values of the West.

Now we are in a period of transition.

■ that connection, I want to say a few words about our current president, Gerhard Casper. I have known Gerhard and his wife, Regina, for many years. He has been one of the great university presidents in America. Our universities have been the place where much new thinking is going on, but also where much of the anguish of America is adapting itself to new circumstances. In all these years, I have admired Gerhard for the contribution that his studies of Constitutional law and his interest in it have made, and his wisdom, intelligence, and always good humor. He has done us, at the Academy, the great honor of spending the year with us, to help guide the transition to a more permanent leadership.

While he was here, he made available his special contacts and his ability to bring people—who

have won the Nobel Prize and other distinctions—to the Academy. Of course, he's been on the Board of the Academy for a decade.

And so he has become part of us. I want to thank him, on behalf of the founders of this institution. But above all, from all the people here from Berlin and other places who believe in the close association between the United States and Europe—and in the very special place Germany has in that.

Gerhard, you have added distinction to this institution, and you have added insights to our lives. And you, of course, will come back here periodically. I want to take this occasion to thank you, on behalf of all of us, for what you have contributed to the West, and what you have contributed to this institution.

Let me say a few words about the transition through which we're all going. The Academy was created in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. At that time, dividing lines were still quite clearly drawn. When one thinks back to the immediate postwar period, one is struck by the fact that Europe, while weakened and destroyed by the war, nevertheless produced a number of leaders who believed in the future of Europe and

in the future of an Atlantic relationship—and out of that chaos built their nation and the European Union. But now we are living in a world in which the dividing lines are not so clearly drawn. There are upheavals in nearly every part of the world, and those upheavals are not carried out in the name of the same principles with which we were familiar in the immediate postwar period. There are different causes and different solutions occurring, but the necessity of the coherence of the Atlantic world and of the friendship between America and Europe has become even greater.

When this institution was founded and in the Cold War, we believed that the values were clearly defined. But now we have debates about idealism and realism, and what should be the principal guidelines of our policy. And we have to learn that all major decisions have to be taken in a limited time period, and that the balance is often very close. Without ideals, there can be no sense of direction. But without a realist understanding, there can only be chaos or stagnation.

So those are the tasks that are before us. For all of these reasons, it is a special joy for me that the Prize this year goes to Samantha Power.

I invited her to lunch when she was appointed as UN Ambassador, expecting that we would define our battle lines, and then, having carried out our obliga-

tions, would observe each other from a distance. I am proud to say that she has become a close friend, because I admire the way she has faced our challenges. There is no doubt about where Samantha stands with respect to our values. The oppressed, the displaced, those suffering offenses to human dignity know that they will have a passionate defender in Samantha. She

does it out of faith and not simply by carrying out instructions. But she has also demonstrated in her conduct at the United Nations that she understands the imperatives of policymaking, which are that one never has, or very rarely, an opportunity for a perfect answer; that one always has to adjust

it, to some extent, to circumstance; and that one has to carry out ideals over a period of time, not in any one heroic effort. All of this she has done with enormous distinction and great charm.

And so it is a great privilege for me to be able to welcome her here, on this the tenth anniversary of the Prize, the first woman who has achieved this distinction. And again, let me tell all of you how much your contribution has meant to what has been created here through the vision of Richard Holbrooke, some decades ago.

Thank you very much.

SPEECH IN HONOR OF AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER BY CHRISTOPH HEUSGEN

Foreign Policy and Security Advisor to Chancellor Merkel

You might understand my degree of perplexity when Gerhard Casper asked me whether I would be prepared to speak on Ambassador Power being awarded the Henry A. Kissinger Prize. I had expected all sorts of things, but Samantha Power and the Henry A. Kissinger Prize—liberal idealism here and the very personification of “Realpolitik” there—just didn’t quite make sense. I was not the only one to have this somewhat puzzled reaction. I called Samantha a few days later to talk about tonight and told her how surprised I had been. She said: “No

worries, Christoph. Henry and I were equally astonished. In fact, Henry was wondering whose career will be more negatively affected by this—his or mine!”

But then I started digging a little deeper and found out how much the Ambassador and the elder statesman have in common. Both came to the US as children. Both made it to the top. Both have a history as Harvard scholars. Both are celebrated authors of bestselling books. Both have a passion for sports, especially baseball. But this is where the comparisons end for now: Henry Kissinger has been a passionate

Yankees fan since his childhood days; Samantha is a die-hard and enthusiastic supporter of the Red Sox. For a German audience we might want to compare this to the age-old rivalry between Schalke 04 and Borussia Dortmund.

One more amazing fact here, when you look at the list of Henry A. Kissinger Prize laureates: obviously, all of them are exceptional individuals who shaped their generation and era—indeed, in some cases, their century. Helmut Kohl, George H. W. Bush, Richard von Weizsäcker, Helmut Schmidt, James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and others. But what stands out is that Samantha Power is by far the youngest person to be awarded this prize. And she is the first woman to receive this honor. It's about time! Samantha, you are a most deserving first female recipient of the Henry A. Kissinger Prize. That is why I consider myself fortunate to have been asked to speak in your honor today.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Many things in life come down to biography.
In celebrating Samantha today, we are also
celebrating a very American story.

At the age of 42, she became the youngest-ever US Ambassador to the United Nations, but this was certainly not preordained. At the age of nine, Samantha Power had left Dublin and her native country of Ireland with her mother, under difficult circumstances, and immigrated to the United States. On their second day in the US, her mother took Samantha to a baseball game, and she subsequently developed her passion for this sport. If the *New Yorker* is right, her passion went so far that she chose a picture of a topless Red Sox shortstop as her screen saver. Samantha took advantage of every opportunity available to her in the New World. After graduating from high school, she spent formative years at Yale. An internship at the elite think-tank, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, led her to journalism and, more particularly, marked the start of defining years, both politically and as a writer. If one now reads her reports from the Serbian-Bosnian ethnic war in former Yugoslavia, from the conflicts in East Timor or—perhaps most powerfully—from Rwanda, one can chart the emergence of the political thinker with whom we now associate Samantha Power's name in particular—that is, the vocal advocate of military intervention on moral grounds, as a last resort. Her skill as a journalist, along with the ease and power with which she keeps her readers and listeners spellbound, is reflected in her speeches



and statements. If you haven't read them—do so. It's worthwhile! Her political thinking continued to mature, particularly during her years as a scholar and professor at Harvard. Her Pulitzer Prize-winning *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*, from 2002, has already become a modern classic of political thought.

In this book, Samantha Power takes us on a grim journey through the recent history of genocides and an alleged failure of US foreign policy in the face of atrocities. *"A Problem from Hell"* is a self-critical and controversial book that admonishes, exhorts, shocks, galvanizes, grips, and inspires us. But one thing it is for sure not. And this is perhaps its real merit—it is not a resigned book; it does not give up in the face of forces and circumstances that seem stronger than those who are responsible for taking political action. It is a book that calls on us not to resign ourselves, not to fall victim to the mistaken belief that we cannot change things anyway. "Don't check the weather," Samantha later said in her own special style in an interview on Charlie Rose. "Don't live in the land of possible. Push!"

In many ways, *"A Problem from Hell"* was a game-changer in Samantha's life. A young senator from Illinois, Barack Obama, was attracted by the book,

interviewed Samantha and consequently made her part of his team. President Obama appointed Samantha Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the White House. In summer 2013, she became US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, following a tough hearing at the US Senate that finally ended in a vote 87 to 10. At a time of entrenched partisan divisions on Capitol Hill, this speaks for itself. And—talking about game changer—last but not least, Samantha Power met legal adviser Cass Sunstein in Obama’s campaign team. He has been her husband for eight years now and is the father of their two wonderful children, Declan, who was born in 2009, and Rían, who came along three years later. They were introduced to politics early on: at age four and one, respectively, they supported their Mom in the Senate hearings, and helped to assert the impressive result.

In her present job, Samantha earned herself the respect and admiration of her colleagues at the UN. In line with her belief in the value of individual human beings, she visited almost all of the roughly 190 ambassadors to the UN. When I asked her predecessor and my counterpart today as National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, about Samantha, she was full of praise for her energy and passion. I liked what Susan said about Samantha’s working methods: She is “utterly relentless,” “absolutely fearless,” “passionate and compassionate” (e.g. meeting with Ebola patients in Africa) and she works on a given subject “like a dog chewing a bone.” (This is supposed to be a compliment!)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In March 2011, the world was confronted with a new “problem from hell.” Troops loyal to Libyan dictator Gaddafi were marching towards the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Gaddafi left no doubt whatever about how he intended to lead this campaign. “There will be no mercy,” he said. He would destroy the rebels “alley by alley, house by house, room by room.” Samantha Power was one of the leading voices among the key US decision-makers of the time to staunchly advocate military intervention by the United States and NATO in view of the foreseeable tragedy. Given the difficult situation in

the country today, the Libya intervention, which was based on UN Security Council Resolutions and led to Gaddafi’s end, is often seen as proof that “liberal” moral notions do not work in real-life politics. Didn’t President Obama himself admit in his much-cited interview with the *The Atlantic* that mistakes had been made as regards Libya? And didn’t the name “Power” stand for optimistic liberal interventionism, whose failure is currently manifesting itself to the world?

In line with her belief in the value of individual human beings, she visited almost all of the roughly 190 ambassadors to the UN.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Samantha, I firmly believe that this criticism is mistaken, regardless of how views on Libya and the liberal interventionist model can differ.

Firstly, it had been a long time since Samantha Power had been—if indeed she ever was—the “activist-in-chief” (as Madeleine Albright once summed up a commonly held bias against her), who may have had over 100,000 followers on Twitter, but was—I quote—“one of the liberals who know their emotions better than their analysis.” (And guess who said that? Yes—it was Henry Kissinger!) On the contrary, rigorous liberalism and the downplaying of “realism” may perhaps have been typical of Samantha Power when she was a young researcher and committed reporter, but she had long since discarded such one-sided notions. Her keen intelligence does not allow for emotions to dominate her thinking. If you don’t believe me, here is what Henry says about her today: “She has an excellent analytical mind ... She knew the difference between being a professor and being a policymaker.”

A complicated reality does not allow for black and white, not even right or wrong, liberalism or realism.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Regardless of where one stands on the military intervention in Libya, I think it is important to note that the decision to use military force in view of a new “problem from hell” goes beyond categorization under the term “humanitarian interventionism” and simple choices in general. A complicated reality does not allow for black and white, not even right or wrong, liberalism or realism.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This brings me to my key point. If morals and realism actually form the opposite poles that we initially

thought were represented by Samantha Power and Henry Kissinger—how important are morals fundamentally in foreign policy? How important are morals for the foreign policy of the United States, of my country, and what we generally refer to as the free world?

To me, the answer is clear. If our foreign policy does not take the individual, and his or her freedom, dignity and uniqueness as a benchmark, then we will not live up to the moral categories and values that we as “the West” stood and stand for. On the other hand, if we neglect reason, the idea of *resipce finem*, and all our interests, we are certain to fail. Rational analytical policies, along with an unwavering moral compass, are what define our transatlantic common ground, our community of shared values. It is important to me to say this in such a landmark transatlantic location as the American Academy. It is in this very spirit that we are now working together to search for solutions to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—aggression that both severely damages our security interests and contravenes what is ultimately our moral demand that borders be inviolable. It is Russia that clearly violated international law and the post-Cold War European order. If we believe in the strength of the law and not the law of the strongest, we must not give in to economic interests, but continue to apply sanctions until the Minsk Agreement has been fully implemented. And we must not accept the annexation by Russia of Crimea. At the same time, we have to engage with Russia to find a way out of the present deadlock. It is in the same spirit that we are now working together in the fight against the so-called “Islamic State,” which—in President Obama’s words—is both a “brand of evil” and very seriously damages our Western interest in stability and orderly conditions in the Middle East. And it is in this very spirit that we are working together as transatlantic partners to solve the refugee crisis, in which we can no longer separate the dimension of human suffering from the issue of long-term political stability in Europe. We had and have a moral obligation to look after the individual victims of warfare, stranded in

Europe, the Middle East, or Africa. But at the same time we have to fight human traffickers and organized criminals and most importantly we have to fight together against the reasons for the flow of refugees: bad governance, ethnic and religious conflicts and climate change.

How we stand by our values and how we bring them

in line with our interests will be something we’ll be judged on as foreign policy makers. Samantha understands this instinctively. She is a passionate patriot and she cares about America’s reputation in the world; she weighs carefully to what end the US deploys its unrivalled military power; she cares about America’s image in the world

when America does not act, even in the face of looming tragedies. And she thinks about conclusions that America’s enemies would draw from a US not wanting or not being able to take action. And, ladies and gentlemen, this is very valid and a fundamentally re-alpolitik consideration. It takes people like Samantha, with all their brilliance, their fearlessness, their moral compass, and their political and intellectual passion to remind us that our decisions in the end effect the life of people, families, parents, brothers, and sisters, wherever we act.

Samantha, you are a most deserving winner of the 2016 Henry A. Kissinger Prize. And on behalf of all those gathered here today, allow me to extend my warmest congratulations to you!



Marianne von Weizsäcker, Gerhard Casper, Samantha Power



Henry A. Kissinger, Samantha Power, Gahl Hodges Burt

CITATION FOR AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER

as read by Chairman of the American Academy Board of Trustees, Gahl Hodges Burt

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Henry A. Kissinger Prize is awarded annually to a renowned figure in the field of international diplomacy. Tonight, the American Academy in Berlin honors Ambassador Samantha Power for her pursuit of a more secure, peaceful, and humane world.

In her position as the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Power has worked diligently to rally the international community to respond to a multitude of global threats—from the Ebola outbreak to the rise of violent extremist groups. She has been a persistent and forceful advocate for human rights and democratic accountability.

As a young journalist, Ms. Power covered the wars in the Balkans, and went on to report from East Timor, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. She attended Harvard Law School, where she began work on what would become her first book, *“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide*—which won a Pulitzer Prize in 2003.

At Harvard’s Kennedy School, she was the Anna Lindh Professor of the Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy and the founding Executive Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

Ms. Power entered government in 2009, serving under President Obama, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the National Security Council. In 2012, the president chose her to chair the newly created Atrocities Prevention Board. On August 1, 2013, Power was sworn in as the twenty-eighth US Ambassador to the United Nations. Throughout her tenure, she consistently humanized the crises the came before the United Nations. She has advanced the cause of international peace and security by securing important UN reforms; strengthening the international response to the global refugee crisis; securing important protections for women’s and LGBT rights; mobilizing an unprecedented

response to North Korea's destabilizing nuclear weapons program; and rallying diplomatic and peacekeeping responses to mass atrocities in sub-Saharan Africa.

As is consistent with the Henry A. Kissinger Prize, Ambassador Power has not only maintained but also strengthened the transatlantic relationships crucial to responding effectively to all of these diplomatic challenges—whether through marshalling the support needed to make UN peacekeeping missions more effective, or by pushing back against a growing global crackdown on

civil society. Throughout, and as the United States' voice in the world's governing body, she has been critical, forthright, and unswerving. In so doing she has become one of the transatlantic community's most indispensable voices, as well as an inspiration for students contemplating careers in the diplomatic corps.

For these reasons, Ambassador Power, on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the American Academy in Berlin, it is with great pleasure that we present to you the 2016 Henry A. Kissinger Prize.

REMARKS* ON TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY REALISM BY AMBASSADOR SAMANTHA POWER

US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, US Mission to the United Nations



Thank you all so much for being here. Thank you, Gahl and Gerhard, for your tremendous leadership of the Academy and for your moving words, both of you. And thank you, Dr. Heusgen, for your over-the-top, extremely generous remarks, and for all you have done personally to deepen the vital partnership between our two nations. Thank you, Henry, for all of the strategic counsel that you have given me since I moved to New York. But beyond that, the simple warmth—the unusual warmth—with which you have greeted me and guided me along my path.

In the introduction to his book *Diplomacy*, Dr. Kissinger wrote about the difference between the intellectuals who analyze international relations and the statesmen who build them. The analyst, he wrote,

can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the statesman's problems are imposed on him. The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes

* As delivered, Berlin, Germany, June 8, 2016.

are irretrievable. The analyst has available to him all the facts; he will be judged on his intellectual power. The statesman must act on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them; he will be judged by history on the basis of how wisely he managed the inevitable change and, above all, by how well he preserves the peace.

That was Dr. Kissinger in *Diplomacy*.

After spending some 15 years as an analyst “running no risk,” I have since had the privilege of serving for nearly eight years as a member of the Obama Administration, where we are on the receiving end of a good deal of judgment by analysts and politicians alike. Of course, analysis and decision-making need not be mutually exclusive. It is imperative that the makers of foreign policy not wait until they have left the arena to step back from time to time to reflect on their decisions and the processes by which they arrived at them. As those of you who have served in such positions know, this is no easy task. Escaping the tyranny of the inbox can feel at times like trying to defy gravity. Our governments, though, must do better at creating the space where this kind of reflection can occur in real time. My beloved friend and mentor Richard Holbrooke conceived of the American Academy partly with this purpose in mind—which is one of the many reasons that I am so honored to be here with you, and to be with his co-conspirator Kati Marton this evening. I’m also profoundly humbled to join such a remarkable group of past recipients, as well as so many dear friends.

Now, if you had told me some 15 years ago—when my first book, *A Problem From Hell*, came out—that I would one day be sitting behind a placard at the United Nations that says the “United States,” I would not have believed you—any more than I suspect Dr. Kissinger would have believed that an award bearing his name would one day be presented to a person who had dedicated the early part of her career to documenting the US government’s failure to stop genocide in the twentieth century. Dr. Kissinger and I have our share of differences about American foreign policy past and present—that is not a secret. But while our appearance here together doesn’t gloss over any differences, it does speak to two striking phenomena.

One is that the rise of extremist and isolationist voices in the United States has accentuated the critical importance of the fundamental internationalist assumptions that have undergirded US foreign policy across party lines since the Second World War. This includes the belief that we cannot isolate ourselves from the world’s problems, and that attempting to do so will make our citizens less—and not more—safe; it includes the premise that our security continues to depend on investing in the transatlantic alliance of NATO, which has long bound our fates together by treating an attack on any one of our nations as an attack on us all; it includes also the view that we are better off in a world where nations are encouraged to give up, rather than build up, nuclear arsenals. These are foundational premises that—even a few years ago—one could not imagine being called into question. Now, though, those of us who hold them dear must unite in their defense.

**It is now objectively
the case that our national
interests are increasingly
affected not just by what
happens between states—
but also what happens
to *people* in states.**

“liberal internationalists,” and the like—these boxes have proven quite anachronistic, they obscure the inherent complexity of most contemporary policy decisions, rather than illuminating a way to navigate the inevitable trade-offs that come before us.

I would like here to put forward a simple thesis that once may have been controversial in a gathering like this one. And that thesis is the following: it is now objectively the case that our national interests are increasingly affected not just by what happens between states—but also what happens to *people* in states. Even if we all agree, with Machiavelli and Dr. Kissinger [*laughter*], that states intrinsically seek to maximize their self-interest, it is precisely that self-interest which requires us to get better at improving human security in the service of national security.

The way governments treat their own citizens matters; it matters because it can have a direct impact on international peace and security—and on our respective national security interests. Consider Russia, where the mothers of soldiers killed fighting in eastern Ukraine have demanded information about their

sons' deaths and access to social services, only to find themselves intimidated, harassed, and in some instances even prosecuted for treason. Why? Because their sons' deaths are the clearest, most incontrovertible evidence of the Russian military's ongoing fighting in eastern Ukraine. As a result of this and similar attacks by the Russian government on independent journalists, human rights defenders, and transparency activists, the Russian people are denied knowledge of—and a say in—a conflict that their government is fueling; a conflict that many Russians might well oppose, were they to know its true scale and costs.

It's not just the Russian people who lose out when their government stifles an informed debate about its military actions—it's the world. When a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council flagrantly tries to expand its territory by lopping off part of a neighboring country, it weakens a core international norm that, when respected, makes all of our nations more secure. The Russian people could demand an end to these acts of aggression; but their government's censorship and repression of voices like those of the soldiers' mothers have prevented even the beginnings of a serious debate from taking place. In effect, the elimination of critical voices inside Russia helps enable acts that are profoundly destabilizing *outside* Russia.

In countries like Venezuela and China, we see the chilling effects of government crackdowns not only on those who stand up for human rights, but also on those who challenge official narratives, including in the economic sphere. When business leaders, journalists, and economists are criticized or attacked for sharing objective information about the economy; when blog posts and news stories are censored for raising legitimate questions about inflated government production figures, dubious currency values, or corrupt officials; when fear prevents people from sharing accurate data about markets, or from recommending reforms that would make them more efficient—the resulting dearth of credible information and the dearth of innovative ideas doesn't just undermine the economy of any one country; it threatens the stability of an ever-more interconnected, regional, and even global, market.

In light of this, we must make a deliberate, sustained effort to understand how our policies impact

—and are seen by—people who live inside other states. When, as a result of our policies, people in other countries see our governments as adversaries rather than allies, and as enablers of repression rather than as champions of their rights—those people can take actions that significantly undermine our security. We've seen it.

Take the current wave of instability roiling the Middle East. Now, some argue that the best way to combat violent extremism is by redoubling our support for the governments in the region, in service of confronting terrorism. Those who urge this approach often argue, very reasonably, that these governments can be critical sources of intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, and that they possess—or ought to possess—a monopoly on the use of violence. However, advocates of this approach also tend to argue—less reasonably—that if only we had done more to keep

the old guard in power as the Arab Spring swept across the region—“order” could have been preserved, and much of the current turmoil could have been averted. Given the way that terrorists have exploited the conflicts that have grown out of the Arab Spring to expand their reach, to recruit new mem-

**Once leaders have lost
legitimacy in the eyes
of the majority of
their people, the question
is not whether they
will fall, but when.**

bers, and to plan and execute attacks—it is not at all surprising to hear people express nostalgia for the relative stability of the pre-Arab Spring Middle East that we had all grown so used to. This argument though often seems to presume that the United States had it within our control to put the Arab Spring genie back in the bottle, either by somehow convincing the millions of people in the streets to accept the abusive governments that they had risked their lives trying to change; or by backing those governments as they brought to bear the tremendous force necessary to dislodge those masses from the streets. I don't believe that violence could have succeeded in beating back the popular tide that arose once people in that region had lost their fear. Rather, I think that once leaders have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of their people, the question is not whether they will fall, but when, and—critically—who will fill the vacuum of power when they do.

We also have to acknowledge that it was repressive, corrupt rule that motivated much of the violence and unrest we see in today's Middle East. After decades of stifling the emergence of independent institutions

in their societies and preventing political evolution, the Mubaraks, Gaddafis, and Ben Alis of the region set the stage for the much more disruptive *revolution* that is harming our interests today. Destabilizing as such revolutions are, there is nothing “realistic” about believing that such rulers can repress their way to governing indefinitely, or that helping them maintain their grip on power will ultimately lead to greater stability for Western democracies. In Iraq, it was the deeply sectarian, corrupt, and abusive rule of Prime Minister Maliki that drove so many Sunnis to support the ascent of ISIL as the terrorist group methodically expanded its foothold. In Syria, as we all know, no single factor has been a bigger boon for the recruitment of violent extremists than the barrel-bombing, gassing, and forced starvation by the Assad regime. In Egypt, one of the greatest incubators for radicalizing individuals has been the country’s appalling prisons, where thousands of peaceful protesters, political opponents, independent journalists, and countless others are now unjustly imprisoned.

We have also seen that when governments commit abuses in the name of fighting terrorism, they alienate the very communities whose trust and cooperation is crucial to effectively combating extremist groups. When citizens see soldiers and police targeting innocent civilians in the name of providing security, and when they come to fear government security forces as much in some cases as they fear violent extremists—those citizens will have little incentive to share the information that is critical to rooting out the terrorists.

So, if we accept that our interests are increasingly bound not only to those of other governments but to the people whom they are supposed to serve, how should our foreign policymaking adapt to this shift?

For one, we need to broaden the spectrum of who we engage with our diplomacy. State-to-state relations matter hugely, but our intelligence and knowledge base of the people who live in those states must get much, much deeper. Diplomats need to spend more time out of the office, where they can meet people affected by the policies they debate, see their impact up close, and develop the expertise and the instinct needed to help anticipate how future deci-

sions will be experienced and interpreted by different communities. Getting up close to real people also helps puncture the inevitable abstraction that can prevent us from seeing the human consequences of our actions. This should include building relationships not only with well-known civil society organizations, but also with groups like teachers associations, workers unions, and leaders in the business community; and not only with the vocal majorities, but with the harder to find and hear minorities. This kind of engagement demands a more robust investment in our diplomatic efforts at a time when many governments—including my own—are facing big pressure to scale back the resources we dedicate to investments overseas, and to cloister diplomats in fortress-like embassies in the parts of the world where such connections are actually needed most. So leaders must make the case to the public not only for why we cannot isolate ourselves from these problems, but



Henry A. Kissinger, Gahl Hodges Burt, Thomas de Maizière, Nina von Maltzahn

also why we must widen the scope of our diplomatic engagement as a national security imperative.

If one way to respond to this shift is through this thicker engagement in—and knowledge of—the world beyond our own borders, another is through investing more deeply in the partnerships and capacities needed to confront contemporary threats that, by their very nature, require a global response. The need for alliances is of course nothing new. As Dr. Kissinger’s masterwork *Diplomacy* makes clear, for as long as the state has existed, diplomats have recognized the need to build partnerships beyond borders to achieve their goals and protect their interests. But what is distinct about many of the problems we

face today is that a coalition or alliance of powerful countries cannot solve most of those problems. For climate change to be stopped—and for its myriad economic, security, and environmental consequences to be averted—it's not enough just for the United States and Europe to bring down our emissions. To prevent terrorists from attacking our citizens, we cannot simply keep them from gaining a foothold in the countries that are our partners. And to stop an outbreak of a deadly virus from turning into a global pandemic, we must do more than build up robust public-health systems at home. With each of these threats, a single weak link in the chain—even in an extremely remote part of the world—can put the security of our citizens at risk.

That is why the Obama administration has poured so much energy into building broader, deeper coalitions that can shore up all the links in the chain—whether that is by persuading countries like China and India to join the Paris Agreement on climate change this year; or working to help ensure that the forces fighting Boko Haram—ISIL's new branch—do not themselves abuse local populations, creating in the process more terrorists than they defeat; or training more doctors and nurses in West Africa, so that the next Ebola outbreak in the region does not reach the devastating proportions of the last one.

And yet—and I think this is the spirit of Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Heusgen's remarks—there are some foreign policy dilemmas for which deepening our diplomatic engagement and marshaling global coalitions will not offer a solution. Such as when the aspirations of the people in a given country cut against our long-standing relationship with its government. Or when we suspect that exerting pressure on a government to move toward a more open, rights-respecting system may actually undermine the limited influence that we

have. This is not a hypothetical balancing act; it is one that is playing out right now in our relationships with countries across the world.

And I wish that we had here tonight the magic formula to navigate these conundrums. We do not. It is a challenge we continue to grapple with—with imperfect results. But we must never be ashamed to ask whether we have been too reticent in pressing certain governments to reform and to respond to the demands

of their citizens—remember, evolution is far preferable to revolution—or whether we have pushed so hard that we have caused governments to distance themselves from us, forfeiting access that might have more gradually allowed us to achieve our desired end, and maybe

squandering our chances of working together to address a shared challenge.

What is certainly not the solution for the contemporary diplomat is to act as if these dilemmas do not exist, or to continue to make foreign policy as though relations between governments were all that mattered. It is indisputable that the motivation of states and the actions of governments matter immensely. But we no longer live in an era in which foreign policymakers can claim to serve their nations' interests by treating what happens to people in other countries as an afterthought. The foreign policy equation has changed.

What happens to people in other countries *matters*. It matters to the welfare of our own nations and our own citizens. The sooner that we can unite in recognition of this fact, the sooner we can sharpen the foreign policy tools that we can use to advance this increasingly complex agenda—the better off our citizens, our nations, and the indispensable transatlantic partnership, will be.

Thank you.



THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY IN BERLIN
HANS ARNHOLD CENTER

Am Sandwerder 17-19
14109 Berlin · Germany
Phone +49 (0)30 804 83 -0 · Fax -111

NEW YORK OFFICE
14 East 60th Street, Suite 604
New York, NY 10022 · USA
Phone +1 (212) 588 -1755 · Fax -1758
www.americanacademy.de

Imprint

© 7/2016 The American Academy in Berlin
Editor: R. Jay Magill
Design: Carolyn Steinbeck · Gestaltung
Photography: Annette Hornischer